[2014V558] IMMACULATE CONCEPTION ACADEMY/DR. JOSE PAULO E. CAMPOS, PETITIONERS, VS. EVELYN E. CAMILON, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 188035
2014 July 2
1st Division
Labor > Labor Standards > Separation Pay
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the March 30, 2009 Decision[1] and May 25, 2009 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105166. The CA had affirmed with modification the February 29, 2008 Decision[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) finding respondent Evelyn Camilon to have been validly dismissed but holding petitioners liable to pay her separation pay as a measure of social justice.
The records bear out the following factual antecedents:
Petitioner Immaculate Conception Academy (ICA) is an educational corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal address at Malihan Street, Poblacion, Dasmariñas, Cavite (Zone IV, Aguinaldo Highway, Dasmariñas, Cavite). Co-petitioner Dr. Jose Paulo Campos is the president of ICA.
Respondent Evelyn Camilon was an employee of ICA for 12 years. She was ICA's Chief Accountant and Administrator from June 2000 until her dismissal. As Chief Accountant, respondent was responsible, among others, for pre-auditing the school cashier's report, checking the entries therein and keeping custody of the petty cash fund. She has also direct supervision over the School Cashier, Janice Loba (Loba).
In July 2004, ICA's Treasurer, Shirley Enobal, received a complaint from the father of one student who claimed that his son was denied issuance of an examination permit for nonpayment of tuition fees despite the fact that the said fees had already been paid.
In August 2004, Cristina Javier, Internal Auditor of ICA, conducted an audit upon the instruction of petitioner Campos. She made the following findings:
a) There were several payments of tuition and school fees made by a number of ICA students which were neither accounted for, turned over and/or posted by the ICA Cashier, Ms. Janice C. Loba, to the students' subsidiary ledgers, nor were the collected amounts deposited in ICA's account with the Rural Bank of Dasmariñas, Inc.;
b) The unaccounted collections received from more or less 186 ICA students amount to ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-ONE PESOS and 45/100 (P1,167,181.45).
x x x x
c) There were missing or unsurrendered booklets of official receipts issued to and received by Ms. Janice C. Loba as cashier which were not accounted for, the amount of collection made therein is still undetermined.
x x x x
d) Ms. Janice C. Loba manipulated entries in the computerized subsidiary ledger and destroyed records so that the unaccounted amounts collected by her and the missing official receipts issued to her as cashier could not be traced or detected.[4]
In a letter[5] dated September 1, 2004, petitioner Campos placed respondent under suspension pending investigation of the case in light of her duties and responsibilities as Chief Accountant of ICA.
In a letter-reply[6] dated September 13, 2004, respondent denied any involvement in the irregularities committed and claimed that she had no intention of profiting at the expense of the school or of betraying the trust reposed on her by the corporation.
On October 27, 2004, petitioners terminated the services of respondent after finding that respondent was negligent and remiss in her duties as the superior officer of Loba. The termination letter reads:
After investigation made regarding the misappropriation and manipulation of Immaculate Conception Academy collections of students' fees by Cashier Janice C. Loba, the management entertains the belief that the misappropriation could have not been committed without your cooperation or assistance apart from your being lax or negligent and [remiss] in the performance of duties as superior officer of Miss Loba.
Consequently, the management has decided to terminate your service from the Immaculate Conception Academy as Chief Accountant effective on the date of your preventive suspension which is September 01, 2004.
Please be advised accordingly.[7]
On November 26, 2004, respondent filed a complaint[8] for illegal dismissal and other money claims against petitioners. The case was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB IV-11-20120-04-C. Respondent claimed that petitioners failed to cite specific negligent acts or to state the manner and means she employed in assisting or cooperating with the cashier in the misappropriation of school funds. Respondent claimed that she was suspended from work without pay despite the absence of any evidence directly or indirectly implicating her in the financial irregularity from September 1, 2004 until her termination on October 27, 2004. Also, she was not given her salary from August 16-30, 2004 and the proportionate sick leave pay and 13th month pay.
On June 5, 2007, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,[9] declaring ICA guilty of illegal dismissal. The fallo of the Labor Arbiter's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondent guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering respondent as follows: Pay complainant her unpaid salary from August 15-30, 2004 in the amount of P12,311.96, proportionate 13th month pay of P16,415.95 and proportionate SIL pay of P3,156.91. Pay complainant her full backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal until the finality of this decision, which is as of this date, is computed in the total amount of P896,846.57[.] Pay complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the amount of P295,487.04. Pay complainant 10% of the total monetary award as attorney's fees. All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[10]
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioners failed to present substantial evidence to prove that respondent has been negligent in her duties as Chief Accountant; hence, her dismissal was illegal. The Labor Arbiter also held that due process was not observed by petitioners in dismissing respondent. The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected, i.e., (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice after due hearing, which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. In this case, the first notice given to the complainant is a notice of preventive suspension. A notice of preventive suspension cannot be considered adequate notice where the objective of the employee's preventive suspension, as stated in the notice, was merely to ascertain the extent of the loss and to pinpoint responsibility of the parties involved and not to apprise the employee of the causes of his desired dismissal.
Petitioners appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC.
On February 29, 2008, the NLRC rendered a decision finding respondent's dismissal and preventive suspension legal and setting aside the awards for back wages, separation pay and attorney's fees. However, the awards for unpaid salary for the period from August 15-30, 2004, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay which respondent already earned even prior to her dismissal was upheld. The NLRC likewise ordered the payment to respondent of her unpaid salaries for the number of working days she remained under preventive suspension beyond 30 days.
The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision states,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered upholding the legality of complainant's dismissal and preventive suspension, and setting aside the awards of backwages, separation pay and attorney's fees stated in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 5 June 2007. Respondent school, however, is ordered as follows: Pay complainant her unpaid salary from August 15-30, 2004 in the amount of Php 12,311.96, proportionate 13th month pay of Php 16,415.95 and proportionate SIL pay of Php 3,156.91. Pay complainant her unpaid salary corresponding to the number of working days in excess of the thirty (30) working days of preventive suspension. SO ORDERED.[11]
The NLRC found that respondent was negligent in the performance of her duties and responsibilities as petitioner's Chief Accountant and as the immediate supervisor of Loba. Respondent's negligence was underscored by the fact that the school records were manipulated and destroyed, official receipts of the school were lost, and the amount of P1,167,181.45 worth of tuition fees paid for by 186 students in an eleven-month period were lost and misappropriated. The NLRC held that these anomalies would not have happened if only respondent did her job to supervise all personnel in the accounting department, to check and verify students' payments, to audit the cashier's report, and to act as custodian of official receipts. The NLRC further stated that given the substantial amount of the loss not only of money but important financial documents as well, there was no doubt that respondent's negligence was gross in character. The NLRC also found the respondent's negligence was not only gross but habitual as well.
Thus, the NLRC ruled that petitioners had just cause to terminate the services of respondent. Although respondent has been in the service for 12 years without derogatory records, such cannot erase the fact that respondent failed to monitor and oversee the finances of her employer.
As to the procedural requirement of due process, the NLRC found that respondent was served a letter dated September 1, 2004 where she was apprised of the investigation of her case regarding her duties and responsibilities as Chief Accountant.
Respondent appealed to the CA.
On March 30, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision[12] affirming the ruling of the NLRC but with the modification that petitioners are held liable to pay separation pay to respondent. The CA justified its award of separation pay to respondent in this wise:
As regards separation pay, petitioner claims that she is entitled thereto considering her 12 years of service for the private respondents as an employee in concurrent various capacities, to wit: Chief Accountant of ICA, acting Administrator of University Physician's Services Inc. (a Campos family-owned subsidiary corporation), Officer-in-Charge in canvassing and purchasing of construction materials, school and office property and equipment, Assistant Secretary of ICA, and, the Head of Human Resources Department of ICA.
We rule that petitioner is entitled to separation pay. An employee who is dismissed for just cause is generally not entitled to separation pay. In some cases, however, the Supreme Court awards separation pay to a legally dismissed employee on grounds of equity and social justice x x x.
In the case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, the Supreme Court emphatically declared: "We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice (Emphasis supplied)."
x x x x This Court holds that petitioner's cause of dismissal does not fall under any of the two circumstances and as such, separation pay should have been awarded to her. Clearly, petitioner's dismissal was not premised on her serious misconduct nor does it involve her moral character.
Accordingly, petitioner's employment of 12 years supports the award of separation pay. Absent any evidence proving her serious misconduct, separation pay should be paid to the petitioner equivalent to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service.[13]
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 29, 2008, and Resolution dated June 20, 2008 of the Second Division of the National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that ICA is hereby held liable for the payment of the separation pay of petitioner Evelyn E. Camilon.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Not agreeing with the ruling, petitioners filed the present petition claiming that the CA erred in awarding separation pay to respondent who was dismissed because of her gross and habitual negligence, a more serious offense than mere inefficiency at work. Petitioners assert that respondent is not entitled to separation pay since her negligence resulted in a substantial amount of loss and destruction of official receipts and schools records. Petitioners also claim that separation pay cannot be justified on the basis of respondent's length of service considering the gravity of the offense committed.
In granting separation pay to respondent, the CA relied on the case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC[15] (PLDT ruling) where the Court held that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. The CA then ruled that since respondent was dismissed for gross and habitual negligence, a cause other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on her moral character, respondent is entitled to the payment of separation pay on the basis of equity and her length of service. According to petitioners, the appellate court's reliance on the case of PLDT v. NLRC in granting separation pay to respondent was misplaced. Petitioners maintain that social justice cannot shield wrongdoers from the legal consequences of their acts and to award separation pay to respondent would have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing respondent for her gross and habitual negligence. Moreover, petitioners aver that even if respondent has been an employee for 12 years, this does not justify the award of separation pay. To do so would be contradictory to the earlier finding of the appellate court that her years in service do not erase the fact that she failed to observe the diligence necessary in the performance of her primary duties.
Petitioners further point out that the PLDT ruling had already been modified if not superseded by this Court's ruling in Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. NLRC[16] where it was ruled that the grant of separation pay should be barred in all cases of just causes under Article 282 of the Labor Code, not only in cases of serious misconduct and those reflecting on the moral character of the employee.
Respondent, meanwhile, maintains that the award of separation pay was proper. According to respondent, separation pay may be given though an employee is validly dismissed when the Court finds justification in applying the principle of social justice. Respondent stresses that she had worked for petitioners with zeal, competence and dedication with no known previous record and therefore, she is entitled to be given full separation pay.[17]
We find merit in the petition.
Prefatorily, we note that respondent Evelyn Camilon did not appeal or file a petition for certiorari to assail the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the NLRC finding her grossly and habitually negligent in her duties for failing to regularly pre-audit the school cashier's report, check the entries therein and keep the custody of the petty cash fund which negligence resulted in the school cashier's (Loba) misappropriation of school funds and students' tuition fees. It is axiomatic that a party who does not appeal or file a petition for certiorari is not entitled to any affirmative relief.[18] An appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or claim affirmative relief unless he has also appealed.[19] Thus, for failure of respondent to assail the validity of her dismissal, such ruling is no longer in issue.
Now to the main issue of whether the CA correctly granted an award of separation pay to respondent as a measure of social justice.
The issue of whether a validly dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay has been settled in the 2007 case of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. NLRC,[20] where it was further clarified that "in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee."
This ruling was reiterated in the case of Central Philippines Bandag Retreaders, Inc. v. Diasnes,[21] where the Court set aside the award of separation pay to Diasnes in view of the latter's gross and habitual negligence. To quote:
To reiterate our ruling in Toyota, labor adjudicatory officials and the CA must demur the award of separation pay based on social justice when an employee's dismissal is based on serious misconduct or willful disobedience; gross and habitual neglect of duty; fraud or willful breach of trust; or commission of a crime against the person of the employer or his immediate family - grounds under Art. 282 of the Labor Code that sanction dismissals of employees. They must be most judicious and circumspect in awarding separation pay or financial assistance as the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be an instrument to oppress the employers. The commitment of the Court to the cause of labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they are right, as here. In fine, we should be more cautious in awarding financial assistance to the undeserving and those who are unworthy of the liberality of the law.
Again in the recent case of Moya v. First Solid Rubber Industries, Inc.,[22] the Court disallowed the payment of separation pay to an employee dismissed from work based on one of the grounds under Article 282 of the Labor Code or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer. Therein, the Court held that Moya's act of concealing the truth from the company is outside of the protective mantle of the principle of social justice.
Pursuant to the aforementioned rulings, respondent is clearly not entitled to separation pay. Respondent was holding a position which involves a high degree of responsibility requiring trust and confidence as it involves the financial interests of the school. However, respondent proved to be unfit for the position when she failed to exercise the necessary diligence in the performance of her duties and responsibilities as Chief Accountant, thus justifying her dismissal from service. Respondent was guilty of gross and habitual negligence when she failed to regularly pre-audit the report of the school cashier, check the entries therein and keep custody of the petty cash fund. Had respondent been assiduously doing her job, the unaccounted school funds would have been discovered right away. Respondent's dereliction in her duties spanned a period of 11 months thus enabling the school cashier to misappropriate tuition fee payments, manipulate the school records and destroy official receipts, in the total amount of P1,167,181.45 to the prejudice of petitioners. Hence, she should not be granted separation pay. To rule otherwise would be to reward respondent for her negligent acts instead of punishing her for her offense. As we held in Reno Foods, Inc. v. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan,[23] "[s]eparation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee's fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause."
As to whether respondent's length of service with petitioners justifies the award of separation pay, we rule in the negative. Respondent's 12 years of service and clean employment record cannot simply erase her gross and habitual negligence in her duties. Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the employer.[24] As we held in Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC,[25]
Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity x x x. The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee's length of service is to be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 30, 2009 Decision and May 25, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105166 are AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of separation pay in favor of respondent Evelyn Camilon is DELETED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
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[1] Rollo, pp. 25-36. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Sesinando E. Villon concurring.
[2] Id. at 39-40.
[3] Id. at 160-172.
[4] Affidavit of Cristina F. Javier, Annex D, records, p. 16.
[5] Annex E, id. at17.
[6] Annex F, id. at 18.
[7] Exhibit A, id. at 38.
[8] Id. at 2-9.
[9] Rollo, pp. 42-50.
[10] Id. at 49.
[11] Id. at 171.
[12] Supra note 1.
[13] Id. at 34-35.
[14] Id. at 35.
[15] 247 Phil. 641, 649 (1988).
[16] 562 Phil. 759 (2007).
[17] Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration, rollo, pp. 260-266.
[18] Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Rivera, G.R. No. 201701, June 3, 2013, 697 SCRA 136, 150, citing Corinthian Gardens Association Inc. v. Sps. Tanjangco, et al., 578 Phil. 712, 723 (2008).
[19] Id.
[20] Supra note 16, at 812.
[21] 580 Phil. 177, 189 (2008).
[22] G.R. No. 184011, September 18, 2013, pp. 7, 10.
[23] G.R. No. 164016, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 240, 249.
[24] Id. at 252.
[25] 555 Phil. 134, 139-140 (2007).
[2014V321] Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association vs Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp
[2014V321] TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER, VS. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 170007
2014 Apr 7
1st Division
#Labor > Labor Relation Law > Unfair Labor Practice
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D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This an appeal from the Decision[1] dated August 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88178 dismissing the petition for certiorari of the petitioner Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association.
The origins of the controversy
In anticipation of the expiration on April 30, 2004 of the 2001-2004 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the petitioner and the respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, the parties started negotiations for a new CBA. After several meetings on the ground rules that would govern the negotiations and on political items, the parties started their discussion on the economic items on July 27, 2004, their 31st meeting. The union proposed a 20% annual across-the-board basic salary increase for the next three years that would be covered by the new CBA. In lieu of the annual salary increases, the company made a counter-proposal to grant all covered employees a lump sum amount of P80,000.00 yearly for the three-year period of the new CBA.[2]
The union requested the company to present its counter-proposal in full detail, similar to the presentation by the union of its economic proposal. The company explained that the lump sum amount was based on its affordability for the corporation, the then current salary levels of the members of the union relative to the industry, and the then current total pay and benefits package of the employees. Not satisfied with the company's explanation, the union asked for further justification of the lump sum amount offered by the company. When the company refused to acknowledge any obligation to give further justification, the union rejected the company's counter-proposal and maintained its proposal for a 20% annual increase in basic pay for the next three years.[3]
On the 39th meeting of the parties on August 24, 2004, the union lowered its proposal to 12% annual across-the-board increase for the next three years. For its part, the company increased its counter-proposal to a yearly lump sum payment of P88,000.00 for the next three years. The union requested financial data for the manufacturing class of business in the Philippines. It also requested justification for the company's counter-offer. In response, the company stated that financial measures for Tabangao were available in the refinery scorecard regularly cascaded by the management to the employees. The company reiterated that its counter-offer is based on its affordability for the company, comparison with the then existing wage levels of allied industry, and the then existing total pay and benefits package of the employees. The company subsequently provided the union with a copy of the company's audited financial statements.[4]
However, the union remained unconvinced and asked for additional documents to justify the company's counter-offer. The company invited the attention of the union to the fact that additional data, such as the refinery performance scorecard, were available from the refinery's website and shared network drives. The company also declared that the bases of its counter-offer were already presented to the union and contained in the minutes of previous meetings. The union thereafter requested for a copy of the comparison of the salaries of its members and those from allied industries. The company denied the request on the ground that the requested information was entrusted to the company under a confidential agreement. Alleging failure on the part of the company to justify its offer, the union manifested that the company was bargaining in bad faith.[5] The company, in turn, expressed its disagreement with the union's manifestation.[6]
On the parties' 41st meeting held on September 2, 2004, the company proposed the declaration of a deadlock and recommended that the help of a third party be sought. The union replied that they would formally answer the proposal of the company a day after the signing of the official minutes of the meeting. On that same day, however, the union filed a Notice of Strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), alleging bad faith bargaining on the part of the company. The NCMB immediately summoned the parties for the mandatory conciliation-mediation proceedings but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.[7]
Assumption of Jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
On September 16, 2004, during the cooling off period, the union conducted the necessary strike vote. The members of the union, who participated in the voting, unanimously voted for the holding of a strike. Upon being aware of this development, the company filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Secretary of Labor and Employment.[8] The petition was filed pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code which provides:
ART. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. - x x x
x x x x
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
The company's petition for assumption of jurisdiction was docketed as OSEC-AJ-0033-04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-09-048-04.
In an Order[9] dated September 20, 2004, the then Secretary of Labor and Employment, Patricia Sto. Tomas, granted the petition of the company. The Secretary of Labor and Employment took notice of the Notice of Strike filed by the union in the NCMB which charged the company with unfair labor practice consisting of bad faith in bargaining negotiations. The Secretary of Labor and Employment also found that the intended strike would likely affect the company's capacity to provide petroleum products to the company's various clientele, including the transportation sector, the energy sector, and the manufacturing and industrial sectors. The Secretary of Labor and Employment further observed that a strike by the union would certainly have a negative impact on the price of commodities. Convinced that such a strike would have adverse consequences on the national economy, the Secretary of Labor and Employment ruled that the labor dispute between the parties would cause or likely to cause a strike in an industry indispensable to the national interest. Thus, the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the dispute of the parties. The dispositive portion of the Order dated September 20, 2004 reads:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing premises, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and the PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Accordingly, any form of concerted action, whether actual or intended, is hereby enjoined. Parties are directed to maintain the status quo existing at the time of service of this Order. They are also ordered not to commit any act that may exacerbate the situation.
However, if at the time of service of this Order a strike has already commenced, the employees are directed to immediately return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt thereof. In such case[,] the employer shall, without unnecessary delay, resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.
To expedite the resolution of this dispute, the parties are directed to submit in three [3] copies, their respective Position Paper on the economic issues and those raised in the Notice of Strike, docketed as NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-09-048-04. It must be submitted personally to this Office within seven [7] calendar days from receipt of this Order. Another three [3] calendar days from receipt of the other party's position paper shall be allowed for the personal filing or submission of their respective Comment and Reply thereon. Service of position papers together with annexes, affidavits and other papers accompanying the same should be done personally. If service by registered mail cannot be avoided, it should follow the mandate of Article 263 of the Labor Code and shall be deemed complete upon the expiration of five (5) calendar days from mailing. After said period[,] the allowed time for filing of Reply shall start, after which, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
The Company is ordered to attach the following documents to its position paper, to assist this Office in the prompt resolution of this case:
a] Complete Audited Financial Statements for the past five [5] years certified as to its completeness by the Chief Financial Comptroller or Accountant, as the case may be[;]
SEC stamped COMPLETE audited Financial Statements shall include the following: Independent Auditor's opinion Comparative Balance Sheet Comparative Income Statement Comparative Cash Flows Notes to the Financial Statements as required by SEC b] Projected Financial Statements of the Company FOR THE NEXT THREE [3] YEARS (Balance Sheets, Income Statements, Cash Flow, and Appropriate notes to such projected [F]inancial Statements);
c] CBA history as to all the economic issues;
d] Cost estimates of its final offer on the specific CBA issues;
e] A separate itemized summary of the Management Offer and the Union demands with [the] following format:
Description of Demands Existing CBA Union Demands Management Offer 1. 2.
The Union is directed to provide a copy of their last CBA, an itemized summary of its CBA demands, as well as a computation of their cost[s] that require resolution in triplicate copies using the same format stated above.
No petition, pleading or any opposition thereto shall be acted upon by this Office, without proof of its service to the adverse party/parties.
In the interest of speedy labor justice, this Office will entertain no motion for extension or postponement.
The urgency of the need to rule on this case is only in faithful adherence to the following provision of Article 263 paragraph (i) of the Labor Code, as follows:
"The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall decide or resolve the dispute within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the assumption of jurisdiction or the certification or submission of the dispute, as the case may be. x x x"
The appropriate police authority is hereby deputized to enforce this Order if it turns out that within twenty-four (24) hours from service hereof, there appears a refusal by either or both parties to comply herewith.[10]
The Secretary of Labor and Employment denied the motion for reconsideration of the union in a Resolution dated October 6, 2004. The union's second motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated December 13, 2004.[11]
Petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
The union thereafter filed a petition for certiorari,[12] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88178, in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005. The union alleged in its petition that the Secretary of Labor and Employment acted with grave abuse of discretion in grossly misappreciating the facts and issue of the case. It contended that the issue is the unfair labor practice of the company in the form of bad faith bargaining and not the CBA deadlock. Anchoring its position on item 8 of what the parties agreed upon as the ground rules that would govern the negotiations, the union argued that, at the time the Order dated September 20, 2004 was issued, there was no CBA deadlock on account of the union's non-conformity with the declaration of a deadlock, as item 8 of the said ground rules provided that a "deadlock can only be declared upon mutual consent of both parties." Thus, the Secretary of Labor and Employment committed grave abuse of discretion when she assumed jurisdiction and directed the parties to submit position papers even on the economic issues.[13]
The Court of Appeals found the position of the union untenable. It cited this Court's ruling in St. Scholastica's College v. Torres[14] that the authority of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes questions and controversies arising from the said dispute, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. Applying St. Scholastica's College, the Court of Appeals found that the 2004 CBA Official Minutes of the Meetings show that the union and the company were already discussing the economic issues when the union accused the company of bargaining in bad faith. As such, the Secretary of Labor and Employment had the authority to take cognizance of the economic issues, which issues were the necessary consequence of the alleged bad faith bargaining.[15]
Moreover, according to the Court of Appeals, Article 263(g) of the Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor and Employment not only the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to national interest but also the power to assume jurisdiction over such industries' labor disputes, including all questions and controversies arising from the said disputes. Thus, as the Secretary of Labor and Employment found the company's business to be one that is indispensable to national interest, she had authority to assume jurisdiction over all of the company's labor disputes, including the economic issues.[16]
Finally, the Court of Appeals noted that the union's contention that the Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot resolve the economic issues because the union had not given its consent to the declaration of a deadlock was already moot. The Court of Appeals observed that the union filed on February 7, 2005 another Notice of Strike citing CBA deadlock as a ground and, in an Order dated March 1, 2005, the then Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment, Manuel Imson, granted the company's Manifestation with Motion to Consider the Second Notice of Strike as Subsumed to the First Notice of Strike.[17]
Given the above reasons, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari of the union. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated August 8, 2005 reads as follows:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the petition must be, as it hereby is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.[18]
A detour: from the National Labor Relations Commission to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
In the meantime, on February 2, 2005, the union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the corporation in the National Labor Relations Commission. The union alleged that the company refused, or violated its duty, to bargain.[19]
The company moved for the dismissal of the complaint, believing that all the elements of forum shopping and/or litis pendentia were present.[20]
In an Order[21] dated May 9, 2005, the Labor Arbiter found that the case arose from the very same CBA negotiations which culminated into a labor dispute when the union filed a notice of strike for bad faith bargaining and CBA deadlock. According to the Labor Arbiter, the issue raised by the union, refusal to bargain, was a proper incident of the labor dispute over which the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction. Thus, the case was forwarded for consolidation with the labor dispute case of the parties in the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
During the pendency of the union's petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Labor and Employment rendered a Decision[22] dated June 8, 2005 in OSEC-AJ-0033-04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-09-048-04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-02-004-05.
In her Decision, the Secretary of Labor and Employment held that there was already deadlock although the ground for the first Notice of Strike was unfair labor practice for bargaining in bad faith. Citing Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-Unified Filipino Service Workers v. Laguesma[23] where it has been held that there may be a deadlock not only in the strict legal sense of an impasse despite reasonable effort at good faith bargaining but also where one of the parties unduly refuses to comply with its duty to bargain, the Secretary of Labor and Employment ruled that the circumstances - 41 CBA meetings showing "reasonable efforts at good faith bargaining" without arriving at a CBA - show that there was effectively a bargaining deadlock between the parties.[24]
Moreover, the Secretary of Labor and Employment also passed upon the issue of whether the company was guilty of bargaining in bad faith:
Now, is the Company guilty of bargaining in bad faith? This Office rules in the negative.
The duty to bargain does not compel any party to accept a proposal, or make any concession, as recognized by Article 252 of the Labor Code, as amended. The purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties; however, the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The laws invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement. Thus, the Company's insistence on a bargaining position to the point of stalemate does not establish bad faith. The Company's offer[,] a lump sum of Php88,000 per year, for each covered employee in lieu of a wage increase cannot, by itself, be taken as an act of bargaining in bad faith. The minutes of the meetings of the parties, show that they both exerted their best efforts, to try to resolve the issues at hand. Many of the proposed improvements or changes, were either resolved, or deferred for further discussion. It is only on the matter of the wage increase, that serious debates were registered. However, the totality of conduct of the Company as far as their bargaining stance with the Union is concerned, does not show that it was bargaining in bad faith.[25]
The Secretary of Labor and Employment then proceeded to decide on the matter of the wage increase and other economic issues of the new CBA. For failure of the union to substantiate its demand for wage increase as it did not file its position paper, the Secretary of Labor and Employment looked at the financial situation of the company, as shown by its audited financial statements, and found it just and equitable to give a lump sum package of P95,000.00 per year, per covered employee, for the new CBA covering the period May 1, 2004 until April 30, 2007. The Secretary of Labor and Employment further retained the other benefits covered by the 2001-2004 CBA as she found the said benefits to be sufficient and reasonable.[26]
Neither the union nor the company appealed the Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.[27] Thus, the said Decision attained finality.
The present petition
The union now comes to this Court to press its contentions. It insists that the corporation is guilty of unfair labor practice through bad faith bargaining. According to the union, bad faith bargaining and a CBA deadlock cannot legally co-exist because an impasse in negotiations can only exist on the premise that both parties are bargaining in good faith. Besides, there could have been no deadlock between the parties as the union had not given its consent to it, pursuant to item 8 of the ground rules governing the parties' negotiations which required mutual consent for a declaration of deadlock. The union also posits that its filing of a CBA deadlock case against the company was a separate and distinct case and not an offshoot of the company's unfair labor practice through bargaining in bad faith. According to the union, as there was no deadlock yet when the union filed the unfair labor practice of bargaining in bad faith, the subsequent deadlock case could neither be an offshoot of, nor an incidental issue in, the unfair labor practice case. Because there was no deadlock yet at the time of the filing of the unfair labor practice case, the union claims that deadlock was not an incidental issue but a non-issue. As deadlock was a non-issue with respect to the unfair labor practice case, the Court of Appeals misapplied St. Scholastica's College and the Secretary of Labor and Employment committed grave abuse of discretion when it presumed deadlock in its Order dated September 20, 2004 assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the union and the company.[28]
For its part, the company argues that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Order dated September 20, 2004 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the parties. The company claims that it is engaged in an industry that is vital to the national interest, and that the evidence on record established that there was already a full-blown labor dispute between the company and the union arising from the deadlock in CBA negotiations. The company insists that the alleged bad faith on its part, which the union claimed to have prevented any CBA deadlock, has no basis. The company invokes the final Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment which ruled that the company was not guilty of bargaining in bad faith. For the company, even if the union's first Notice of Strike was based on unfair labor practice and not deadlock in bargaining, the Secretary of Labor and Employment's assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the parties extended to all questions and controversies arising from the labor dispute, that is, including the economic issues.[29]
The Court's ruling
The petition fails. There are at least four reasons to support the denial of the petition and each reason is sufficient to defeat the union's claims.
First, the petition is barred by res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.
The concept of conclusiveness of judgment is explained in Nabus v. Court of Appeals[30] as follows:
The doctrine states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The only identities thus required for the operation of the judgment as an estoppel x x x are identity of parties and identity of issues.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties [or their privies] will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit[.] x x x. (Citations omitted.)
The Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the labor dispute over which he assumed jurisdiction, OSEC-AJ-0033-04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-09-048-04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-02-004-05, has long attained finality. The union never denied this.
In this connection, Article 263(i) of the Labor Code is clear:
ART. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. - x x x
x x x x
(i) The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall decide or resolve the dispute within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the assumption of jurisdiction or the certification or submission of the dispute, as the case may be. The decision of the President, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties. (Emphases supplied.)
Pursuant to Article 263(i) of the Labor Code, therefore, the Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment became final and executory after the lapse of the period provided under the said provision. Moreover, neither party further questioned the Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
The Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment already considered and ruled upon the issues being raised by the union in this petition. In particular, the said Decision already passed upon the issue of whether there was already an existing deadlock between the union and the company when the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over their labor dispute. The said Decision also answered the issue of whether the company was guilty of bargaining in bad faith. As the Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment already settled the said issues with finality, the union cannot once again raise those issues in this Court through this petition without violating the principle of res judicata, particularly in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.
Second, a significant consequence of the finality of the Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is that it rendered the controversy between the union and the company moot.
In particular, with the finality of the Decision dated June 8, 2005, the labor dispute, covering both the alleged bargaining in bad faith and the deadlock, between the union and the company was settled with finality. As the said Decision settled essentially the same questions being raised by the union in this case, the finality of the said Decision rendered this case moot. The union cannot be allowed to use this case to once again unsettle the issues that have been already settled with finality by the final and executory Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Moreover, the issues of alleged bargaining in bad faith on the part of the company and the deadlock in the negotiations were both incident to the framing of a new CBA that would govern the parties for the period 2004 to 2007. Not only had the said period long lapsed, the final Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment also facilitated the framing of the new CBA, particularly on the disputed provision on annual lump sum payment in lieu of wage increase. The dispositive portion of the said Decision is clear and categorical:
WHEREFORE, this Office hereby orders:
1. The award of Php95,000 lump sum, per covered employee per year, for the duration of their CBA, effective 01 May 2004 to 30 April 2007;
2. The retention of benefits on vacation leave, sick leave, and special leave as provided in the 2001-2004 CBA;
3. All improvements that [the] parties may have agreed upon during the negotiations, are adopted as part of the CBA. All other demands, not passed upon herein, are deemed DENIED.
The parties are hereby directed, to submit a copy of the CBA incorporating the awards granted herein, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.[31]
As the above directive of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the decretal portion of the Decision dated June 8, 2005 has long been final and executory, the dispute on the matter of the provision on annual wage increase contra yearly lump sum payment is already moot.
Third, the petition is improper as it presents questions of fact. A question of fact cannot properly be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[32] This petition of the union now before this Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The existence of bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary.[33] The crucial question of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case, and good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts.[34] Thus, the issue of whether or not there was bad faith on the part of the company when it was bargaining with the union is a question of fact. It requires that the reviewing court look into the evidence to find if indeed there is proof that is substantial enough to show such bad faith.
The issue of whether there was already deadlock between the union and the company is likewise a question of fact. It requires the determination of evidence to find whether there is a "counteraction" of forces between the union and the company and whether each of the parties exerted "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining."[35] This is so because a deadlock is defined as follows:
A 'deadlock' is x x x the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage; x x x There is a deadlock when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed forces x x x. The word is synonymous with the word impasse, which x x x 'presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between the parties.'[36]
Considering that the issues presented by the union are factual issues, the union's petition is improper. As a rule, this Court cannot properly inquire into factual matters in the exercise of its judicial power under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, none of the exceptions apply in this case.
Fourth, and finally, assuming that this Court may disregard the conclusiveness of judgment and review the factual matters raised by the union, the merits are still not in the union's favor.
The findings of fact of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the Decision dated June 8, 2005 that there already existed a bargaining deadlock when she assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the union and the company, and that there was no bad faith on the part of the company when it was bargaining with the union are both supported by substantial evidence. This Court sees no reason to reverse or overturn the said findings.
The final and executory Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment squarely addressed the contention of the union that the company was guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The said Decision correctly characterized the nature of the duty to bargain, that is, it does not compel any party to accept a proposal or to make any concession.[37] While the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement between the employer and the employee's union resulting in a binding contract between the parties, the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does not mean lack of good faith. The laws invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract but do not compel one.[38] For after all, a CBA, like any contract is a product of mutual consent and not of compulsion. As such, the duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.[39] In this light, the corporation's unswerving position on the matter of annual lump sum payment in lieu of wage increase did not, by itself, constitute bad faith even if such position caused a stalemate in the negotiations, as correctly ruled by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the decision dated June 8, 2005.
As there was no bad faith on the part of the company in its bargaining with the union, deadlock was possible and did occur. The union's reliance on item 8 of the ground rules governing the parties' negotiations which required mutual consent for a declaration of deadlock was reduced to irrelevance by the actual facts. Contra factum non valet argumentum. There is no argument against facts. And the fact is that the negotiations between the union and the company were stalled by the opposing offers of yearly wage increase by the union, on the one hand, and annual lump sum payment by the company, on the other hand. Each party found the other's offer unacceptable and neither party was willing to yield. The company suggested seeking the assistance of a third party to settle the issue but the union preferred the remedy of filing a notice of strike. Each party was adamant in its position. Thus, because of the unresolved issue on wage increase, there was actually a complete stoppage of the ongoing negotiations between the parties and the union filed a Notice of Strike. A mutual declaration would neither add to nor subtract from the reality of the deadlock then existing between the parties. Thus, the absence of the parties' mutual declaration of deadlock does not mean that there was no deadlock. At most, it would have been simply a recognition of the prevailing status quo between the parties.
More importantly, the union only caused confusion in the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor and Employment when it questioned the latter's assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the union and the company on the ground that the "Secretary erred in assuming jurisdiction over the 'CBA' case when it [was] not the subject matter of the notice of strike" because the case was "all about 'ULP' in the form of bad faith bargaining." For the union, the Secretary of Labor and Employment should not have touched the issue of the CBA as there was no CBA deadlock at that time, and should have limited the assumption of jurisdiction to the charge of unfair labor practice for bargaining in bad faith.[40]
The union is wrong.
As discussed above, there was already an actual existing deadlock between the parties. What was lacking was the formal recognition of the existence of such a deadlock because the union refused a declaration of deadlock. Thus, the union's view that, at the time the Secretary of Labor and Employment exercised her power of assumption of jurisdiction, the issue of deadlock was neither an incidental issue to the matter of unfair labor practice nor an existing issue is incorrect.
More importantly, however, the union's mistaken theory that the deadlock issue was neither incidental nor existing is based on its premise that the case is all about the company's alleged unfair labor practice of bargaining in bad faith, which is the ground stated in its first Notice of Strike. In particular, the union asserts:
The evidentiary value of the Notice of Strike for ULP of BAD FAITH BARGAINING (Annex "M" of the petition) cannot be taken for granted. It is the very important documentary evidence that shows what is the existing "labor dispute" between the parties.[41]
While the first Notice of Strike is indeed significant in the determination of the existing labor dispute between the parties, it is not the sole criterion. As this Court explained in Union of Filipro Employees-Drug, Food and Allied Industries Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Nestle Philippines, Inc.[42]:
The Secretary of the DOLE has been explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. And, as a matter of necessity, it includes questions incidental to the labor dispute; that is, issues that are necessarily involved in the dispute itself, and not just to that ascribed in the Notice of Strike or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The totality of the company's Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction, including every allegation therein, also guided the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the proper determination of the labor dispute over which he or she was being asked to assume jurisdiction.
A "labor dispute" is defined under Article 212(l) of the Labor Code as follows:
ART. 212. Definitions. - x x x
x x x x
(l) "Labor dispute" includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
In this case, there was a dispute, an unresolved issue on several matters, between the union and the company in the course of the negotiations for a new CBA. Among the unsettled issues was the matter of compensation. In particular, paragraphs 1 to 6 of the statement of Antecedent Facts in the company's Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction[43] read:
1. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of the Company and the Union expired on 30 April 2004.
2. Thus, as early as 13 April 2004, the Company and the Union already met to discuss the ground rules that would govern their upcoming negotiations. Then, on 15 April 2004, the Union submitted its proposals for the renewal of their CBA.
3. While a total of 41 meetings were held between the parties, several items, including the matter of compensation, remained unresolved.
Copies of the Minutes of the 41 meetings are attached hereto and made integral part hereof as Annexes "A" to "A-40".
4. On 2 September 2004, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB, Region IV based in Calamba, Laguna anchored on a perceived unfair labor practice consisting of alleged bad faith bargaining on the part of the Company.
Although there is no basis to the charge of unfair labor practice as to give a semblance of validity to the notice of strike, the Company willingly and actually participated in the conciliation and mediation conferences called by the NCMB to settle the dispute.
A copy of the Notice of Strike is attached hereto and made integral part hereof as Annex "B".
5. Although conciliation meetings have been conducted by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) through Conciliator Leodegario Teodoro on 09 and 13 September 2004, no settlement of the dispute has yet been agreed upon.
6. Based on the attendant circumstances, as well as on the actuations of the Union officers and members, it is likely that the Union has already conducted, or is set to conduct soon, a strike vote.[44]
Thus, the labor dispute between the union and the company concerned the unresolved matters between the parties in relation to their negotiations for a new CBA. The power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over this dispute includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from the said dispute, such as, but not limited to the union's allegation of bad faith bargaining. It also includes and extends to the various unresolved provisions of the new CBA such as compensation, particularly the matter of annual wage increase or yearly lump sum payment in lieu of such wage increase, whether or not there was deadlock in the negotiations. Indeed, nowhere does the Order dated September 20, 2004 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment mention a CBA deadlock. What the union viewed as constituting the inclusion of a CBA deadlock in the assumption of jurisdiction was the inclusion of the economic issues, particularly the company's stance of yearly lump sum payment in lieu of annual wage increase, in the directive for the parties to submit their respective position papers.[45] The union's Motion for Reconsideration (With Urgent Prayer to Compel the Company to Justify Offer of Wage [Increase] Moratorium) and Second Motion for Reconsideration questioning the Order dated September 20, 2004 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment actually confirm that the labor dispute between the parties essentially and necessarily includes the conflicting positions of the union, which advocates annual wage increase, and of the company, which offers yearly lump sum payment in lieu of wage increase. In fact, that is the reason behind the union's prayer that the company be ordered to justify its offer of wage increase moratorium.[46] As there is already an existing controversy on the matter of wage increase, the Secretary of Labor and Employment need not wait for a deadlock in the negotiations to take cognizance of the matter. That is the significance of the power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. As this Court elucidated in Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International v. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment[47]:
Article 263(g) is both an extraordinary and a preemptive power to address an extraordinary situation - a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. This grant is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the term "assume jurisdiction" connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout; it includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from or related to the dispute, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. (Citation omitted.)
Everything considered, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment committed no abuse of discretion when she assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute of the union and the company.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 52-63; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring.
[2] Id. at 53.
[3] Id.
[4] Id. at 54.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 163.
[7] Id. at 54-55.
[8] Id. at 55.
[9] Id. at 168-172.
[10] Id. at 171-172.
[11] Id. at 59.
[12] Id. at 67-96.
[13] Id. at 76-79.
[14] G.R. No. 100158, June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA 565.
[15] Rollo, pp. 60-62.
[16] Id. at 62.
[17] Id. at 63.
[18] Id. at 63.
[19] Id. at 208-209.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 354-397, 360; Memorandum of the company in CA-G.R. SP No. 88178.
[21] Id. at 392-397.
[22] Rollo, pp. 295-302.
[23] 335 Phil. 170 (1997).
[24] Rollo, pp. 299-300.
[25] Id. at 300.
[26] Id. at 300-301.
[27] Id. at 262.
[28] Id. at 24-42.
[29] Id. at 244-262.
[30] 271 Phil. 768, 784 (1991).
[31] Rollo, pp. 301-302.
[32] Only questions of law should be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 (Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Minterbro-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor, G.R. No. 174300, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 28, 41).
[33] Belle Corporation v. De Leon-Banks, G.R. No. 174669, September 19, 2012, 681 SCRA 351, 362.
[34] Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, 346 Phil. 524, 534 (1997).
[35] See Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-Unified Filipino Service Workers v. Laguesma, supra note 23 at 179.
[36] Id. at 178-179, citing Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 91915, September 11, 1992, 213 SCRA 759, 773.
[37] In this connection, Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the duty to bargain collectively as follows:
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreements and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession. (Emphasis supplied.)
[38] Union of Filipro Employees-Drug, Food and Allied Industries Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., 571 Phil. 29, 41 (2008).
[39] Id.
[40] Rollo, p. 178.
[41] Id. at 118.
[42] Supra note 38 at 49.
[43] CA rollo, pp. 32-40.
[44] Id. at 33-34.
[45] See union's Motion for Reconsideration (With Urgent Prayer to Compel the Company to Justify Offer of Wage Moratorium) and Second Motion for Reconsideration, rollo, pp. 173-180 and 188-195, respectively.
[46] Id. at 180 and 195.
[47] G.R. No. 167401, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 185, 205-206.
G.R. No. 170007
2014 Apr 7
1st Division
#Labor > Labor Relation Law > Unfair Labor Practice
(Download UtakPinoy.Com Software for Lawyers)
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This an appeal from the Decision[1] dated August 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88178 dismissing the petition for certiorari of the petitioner Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association.
The origins of the controversy
In anticipation of the expiration on April 30, 2004 of the 2001-2004 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the petitioner and the respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, the parties started negotiations for a new CBA. After several meetings on the ground rules that would govern the negotiations and on political items, the parties started their discussion on the economic items on July 27, 2004, their 31st meeting. The union proposed a 20% annual across-the-board basic salary increase for the next three years that would be covered by the new CBA. In lieu of the annual salary increases, the company made a counter-proposal to grant all covered employees a lump sum amount of P80,000.00 yearly for the three-year period of the new CBA.[2]
The union requested the company to present its counter-proposal in full detail, similar to the presentation by the union of its economic proposal. The company explained that the lump sum amount was based on its affordability for the corporation, the then current salary levels of the members of the union relative to the industry, and the then current total pay and benefits package of the employees. Not satisfied with the company's explanation, the union asked for further justification of the lump sum amount offered by the company. When the company refused to acknowledge any obligation to give further justification, the union rejected the company's counter-proposal and maintained its proposal for a 20% annual increase in basic pay for the next three years.[3]
On the 39th meeting of the parties on August 24, 2004, the union lowered its proposal to 12% annual across-the-board increase for the next three years. For its part, the company increased its counter-proposal to a yearly lump sum payment of P88,000.00 for the next three years. The union requested financial data for the manufacturing class of business in the Philippines. It also requested justification for the company's counter-offer. In response, the company stated that financial measures for Tabangao were available in the refinery scorecard regularly cascaded by the management to the employees. The company reiterated that its counter-offer is based on its affordability for the company, comparison with the then existing wage levels of allied industry, and the then existing total pay and benefits package of the employees. The company subsequently provided the union with a copy of the company's audited financial statements.[4]
However, the union remained unconvinced and asked for additional documents to justify the company's counter-offer. The company invited the attention of the union to the fact that additional data, such as the refinery performance scorecard, were available from the refinery's website and shared network drives. The company also declared that the bases of its counter-offer were already presented to the union and contained in the minutes of previous meetings. The union thereafter requested for a copy of the comparison of the salaries of its members and those from allied industries. The company denied the request on the ground that the requested information was entrusted to the company under a confidential agreement. Alleging failure on the part of the company to justify its offer, the union manifested that the company was bargaining in bad faith.[5] The company, in turn, expressed its disagreement with the union's manifestation.[6]
On the parties' 41st meeting held on September 2, 2004, the company proposed the declaration of a deadlock and recommended that the help of a third party be sought. The union replied that they would formally answer the proposal of the company a day after the signing of the official minutes of the meeting. On that same day, however, the union filed a Notice of Strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), alleging bad faith bargaining on the part of the company. The NCMB immediately summoned the parties for the mandatory conciliation-mediation proceedings but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.[7]
Assumption of Jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
On September 16, 2004, during the cooling off period, the union conducted the necessary strike vote. The members of the union, who participated in the voting, unanimously voted for the holding of a strike. Upon being aware of this development, the company filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Secretary of Labor and Employment.[8] The petition was filed pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code which provides:
ART. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. - x x x
x x x x
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
The company's petition for assumption of jurisdiction was docketed as OSEC-AJ-0033-04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-09-048-04.
In an Order[9] dated September 20, 2004, the then Secretary of Labor and Employment, Patricia Sto. Tomas, granted the petition of the company. The Secretary of Labor and Employment took notice of the Notice of Strike filed by the union in the NCMB which charged the company with unfair labor practice consisting of bad faith in bargaining negotiations. The Secretary of Labor and Employment also found that the intended strike would likely affect the company's capacity to provide petroleum products to the company's various clientele, including the transportation sector, the energy sector, and the manufacturing and industrial sectors. The Secretary of Labor and Employment further observed that a strike by the union would certainly have a negative impact on the price of commodities. Convinced that such a strike would have adverse consequences on the national economy, the Secretary of Labor and Employment ruled that the labor dispute between the parties would cause or likely to cause a strike in an industry indispensable to the national interest. Thus, the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the dispute of the parties. The dispositive portion of the Order dated September 20, 2004 reads:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing premises, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and the PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Accordingly, any form of concerted action, whether actual or intended, is hereby enjoined. Parties are directed to maintain the status quo existing at the time of service of this Order. They are also ordered not to commit any act that may exacerbate the situation.
However, if at the time of service of this Order a strike has already commenced, the employees are directed to immediately return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt thereof. In such case[,] the employer shall, without unnecessary delay, resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.
To expedite the resolution of this dispute, the parties are directed to submit in three [3] copies, their respective Position Paper on the economic issues and those raised in the Notice of Strike, docketed as NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-09-048-04. It must be submitted personally to this Office within seven [7] calendar days from receipt of this Order. Another three [3] calendar days from receipt of the other party's position paper shall be allowed for the personal filing or submission of their respective Comment and Reply thereon. Service of position papers together with annexes, affidavits and other papers accompanying the same should be done personally. If service by registered mail cannot be avoided, it should follow the mandate of Article 263 of the Labor Code and shall be deemed complete upon the expiration of five (5) calendar days from mailing. After said period[,] the allowed time for filing of Reply shall start, after which, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
The Company is ordered to attach the following documents to its position paper, to assist this Office in the prompt resolution of this case:
a] Complete Audited Financial Statements for the past five [5] years certified as to its completeness by the Chief Financial Comptroller or Accountant, as the case may be[;]
SEC stamped COMPLETE audited Financial Statements shall include the following: Independent Auditor's opinion Comparative Balance Sheet Comparative Income Statement Comparative Cash Flows Notes to the Financial Statements as required by SEC b] Projected Financial Statements of the Company FOR THE NEXT THREE [3] YEARS (Balance Sheets, Income Statements, Cash Flow, and Appropriate notes to such projected [F]inancial Statements);
c] CBA history as to all the economic issues;
d] Cost estimates of its final offer on the specific CBA issues;
e] A separate itemized summary of the Management Offer and the Union demands with [the] following format:
Description of Demands Existing CBA Union Demands Management Offer 1. 2.
The Union is directed to provide a copy of their last CBA, an itemized summary of its CBA demands, as well as a computation of their cost[s] that require resolution in triplicate copies using the same format stated above.
No petition, pleading or any opposition thereto shall be acted upon by this Office, without proof of its service to the adverse party/parties.
In the interest of speedy labor justice, this Office will entertain no motion for extension or postponement.
The urgency of the need to rule on this case is only in faithful adherence to the following provision of Article 263 paragraph (i) of the Labor Code, as follows:
"The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall decide or resolve the dispute within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the assumption of jurisdiction or the certification or submission of the dispute, as the case may be. x x x"
The appropriate police authority is hereby deputized to enforce this Order if it turns out that within twenty-four (24) hours from service hereof, there appears a refusal by either or both parties to comply herewith.[10]
The Secretary of Labor and Employment denied the motion for reconsideration of the union in a Resolution dated October 6, 2004. The union's second motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated December 13, 2004.[11]
Petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
The union thereafter filed a petition for certiorari,[12] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88178, in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005. The union alleged in its petition that the Secretary of Labor and Employment acted with grave abuse of discretion in grossly misappreciating the facts and issue of the case. It contended that the issue is the unfair labor practice of the company in the form of bad faith bargaining and not the CBA deadlock. Anchoring its position on item 8 of what the parties agreed upon as the ground rules that would govern the negotiations, the union argued that, at the time the Order dated September 20, 2004 was issued, there was no CBA deadlock on account of the union's non-conformity with the declaration of a deadlock, as item 8 of the said ground rules provided that a "deadlock can only be declared upon mutual consent of both parties." Thus, the Secretary of Labor and Employment committed grave abuse of discretion when she assumed jurisdiction and directed the parties to submit position papers even on the economic issues.[13]
The Court of Appeals found the position of the union untenable. It cited this Court's ruling in St. Scholastica's College v. Torres[14] that the authority of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes questions and controversies arising from the said dispute, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. Applying St. Scholastica's College, the Court of Appeals found that the 2004 CBA Official Minutes of the Meetings show that the union and the company were already discussing the economic issues when the union accused the company of bargaining in bad faith. As such, the Secretary of Labor and Employment had the authority to take cognizance of the economic issues, which issues were the necessary consequence of the alleged bad faith bargaining.[15]
Moreover, according to the Court of Appeals, Article 263(g) of the Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor and Employment not only the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to national interest but also the power to assume jurisdiction over such industries' labor disputes, including all questions and controversies arising from the said disputes. Thus, as the Secretary of Labor and Employment found the company's business to be one that is indispensable to national interest, she had authority to assume jurisdiction over all of the company's labor disputes, including the economic issues.[16]
Finally, the Court of Appeals noted that the union's contention that the Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot resolve the economic issues because the union had not given its consent to the declaration of a deadlock was already moot. The Court of Appeals observed that the union filed on February 7, 2005 another Notice of Strike citing CBA deadlock as a ground and, in an Order dated March 1, 2005, the then Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment, Manuel Imson, granted the company's Manifestation with Motion to Consider the Second Notice of Strike as Subsumed to the First Notice of Strike.[17]
Given the above reasons, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari of the union. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated August 8, 2005 reads as follows:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the petition must be, as it hereby is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.[18]
A detour: from the National Labor Relations Commission to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
In the meantime, on February 2, 2005, the union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the corporation in the National Labor Relations Commission. The union alleged that the company refused, or violated its duty, to bargain.[19]
The company moved for the dismissal of the complaint, believing that all the elements of forum shopping and/or litis pendentia were present.[20]
In an Order[21] dated May 9, 2005, the Labor Arbiter found that the case arose from the very same CBA negotiations which culminated into a labor dispute when the union filed a notice of strike for bad faith bargaining and CBA deadlock. According to the Labor Arbiter, the issue raised by the union, refusal to bargain, was a proper incident of the labor dispute over which the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction. Thus, the case was forwarded for consolidation with the labor dispute case of the parties in the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
During the pendency of the union's petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Labor and Employment rendered a Decision[22] dated June 8, 2005 in OSEC-AJ-0033-04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-09-048-04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-02-004-05.
In her Decision, the Secretary of Labor and Employment held that there was already deadlock although the ground for the first Notice of Strike was unfair labor practice for bargaining in bad faith. Citing Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-Unified Filipino Service Workers v. Laguesma[23] where it has been held that there may be a deadlock not only in the strict legal sense of an impasse despite reasonable effort at good faith bargaining but also where one of the parties unduly refuses to comply with its duty to bargain, the Secretary of Labor and Employment ruled that the circumstances - 41 CBA meetings showing "reasonable efforts at good faith bargaining" without arriving at a CBA - show that there was effectively a bargaining deadlock between the parties.[24]
Moreover, the Secretary of Labor and Employment also passed upon the issue of whether the company was guilty of bargaining in bad faith:
Now, is the Company guilty of bargaining in bad faith? This Office rules in the negative.
The duty to bargain does not compel any party to accept a proposal, or make any concession, as recognized by Article 252 of the Labor Code, as amended. The purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties; however, the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The laws invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement. Thus, the Company's insistence on a bargaining position to the point of stalemate does not establish bad faith. The Company's offer[,] a lump sum of Php88,000 per year, for each covered employee in lieu of a wage increase cannot, by itself, be taken as an act of bargaining in bad faith. The minutes of the meetings of the parties, show that they both exerted their best efforts, to try to resolve the issues at hand. Many of the proposed improvements or changes, were either resolved, or deferred for further discussion. It is only on the matter of the wage increase, that serious debates were registered. However, the totality of conduct of the Company as far as their bargaining stance with the Union is concerned, does not show that it was bargaining in bad faith.[25]
The Secretary of Labor and Employment then proceeded to decide on the matter of the wage increase and other economic issues of the new CBA. For failure of the union to substantiate its demand for wage increase as it did not file its position paper, the Secretary of Labor and Employment looked at the financial situation of the company, as shown by its audited financial statements, and found it just and equitable to give a lump sum package of P95,000.00 per year, per covered employee, for the new CBA covering the period May 1, 2004 until April 30, 2007. The Secretary of Labor and Employment further retained the other benefits covered by the 2001-2004 CBA as she found the said benefits to be sufficient and reasonable.[26]
Neither the union nor the company appealed the Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.[27] Thus, the said Decision attained finality.
The present petition
The union now comes to this Court to press its contentions. It insists that the corporation is guilty of unfair labor practice through bad faith bargaining. According to the union, bad faith bargaining and a CBA deadlock cannot legally co-exist because an impasse in negotiations can only exist on the premise that both parties are bargaining in good faith. Besides, there could have been no deadlock between the parties as the union had not given its consent to it, pursuant to item 8 of the ground rules governing the parties' negotiations which required mutual consent for a declaration of deadlock. The union also posits that its filing of a CBA deadlock case against the company was a separate and distinct case and not an offshoot of the company's unfair labor practice through bargaining in bad faith. According to the union, as there was no deadlock yet when the union filed the unfair labor practice of bargaining in bad faith, the subsequent deadlock case could neither be an offshoot of, nor an incidental issue in, the unfair labor practice case. Because there was no deadlock yet at the time of the filing of the unfair labor practice case, the union claims that deadlock was not an incidental issue but a non-issue. As deadlock was a non-issue with respect to the unfair labor practice case, the Court of Appeals misapplied St. Scholastica's College and the Secretary of Labor and Employment committed grave abuse of discretion when it presumed deadlock in its Order dated September 20, 2004 assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the union and the company.[28]
For its part, the company argues that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Order dated September 20, 2004 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the parties. The company claims that it is engaged in an industry that is vital to the national interest, and that the evidence on record established that there was already a full-blown labor dispute between the company and the union arising from the deadlock in CBA negotiations. The company insists that the alleged bad faith on its part, which the union claimed to have prevented any CBA deadlock, has no basis. The company invokes the final Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment which ruled that the company was not guilty of bargaining in bad faith. For the company, even if the union's first Notice of Strike was based on unfair labor practice and not deadlock in bargaining, the Secretary of Labor and Employment's assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the parties extended to all questions and controversies arising from the labor dispute, that is, including the economic issues.[29]
The Court's ruling
The petition fails. There are at least four reasons to support the denial of the petition and each reason is sufficient to defeat the union's claims.
First, the petition is barred by res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.
The concept of conclusiveness of judgment is explained in Nabus v. Court of Appeals[30] as follows:
The doctrine states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The only identities thus required for the operation of the judgment as an estoppel x x x are identity of parties and identity of issues.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties [or their privies] will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit[.] x x x. (Citations omitted.)
The Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the labor dispute over which he assumed jurisdiction, OSEC-AJ-0033-04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-09-048-04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-02-004-05, has long attained finality. The union never denied this.
In this connection, Article 263(i) of the Labor Code is clear:
ART. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. - x x x
x x x x
(i) The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall decide or resolve the dispute within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the assumption of jurisdiction or the certification or submission of the dispute, as the case may be. The decision of the President, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties. (Emphases supplied.)
Pursuant to Article 263(i) of the Labor Code, therefore, the Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment became final and executory after the lapse of the period provided under the said provision. Moreover, neither party further questioned the Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
The Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment already considered and ruled upon the issues being raised by the union in this petition. In particular, the said Decision already passed upon the issue of whether there was already an existing deadlock between the union and the company when the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over their labor dispute. The said Decision also answered the issue of whether the company was guilty of bargaining in bad faith. As the Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment already settled the said issues with finality, the union cannot once again raise those issues in this Court through this petition without violating the principle of res judicata, particularly in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.
Second, a significant consequence of the finality of the Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is that it rendered the controversy between the union and the company moot.
In particular, with the finality of the Decision dated June 8, 2005, the labor dispute, covering both the alleged bargaining in bad faith and the deadlock, between the union and the company was settled with finality. As the said Decision settled essentially the same questions being raised by the union in this case, the finality of the said Decision rendered this case moot. The union cannot be allowed to use this case to once again unsettle the issues that have been already settled with finality by the final and executory Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Moreover, the issues of alleged bargaining in bad faith on the part of the company and the deadlock in the negotiations were both incident to the framing of a new CBA that would govern the parties for the period 2004 to 2007. Not only had the said period long lapsed, the final Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment also facilitated the framing of the new CBA, particularly on the disputed provision on annual lump sum payment in lieu of wage increase. The dispositive portion of the said Decision is clear and categorical:
WHEREFORE, this Office hereby orders:
1. The award of Php95,000 lump sum, per covered employee per year, for the duration of their CBA, effective 01 May 2004 to 30 April 2007;
2. The retention of benefits on vacation leave, sick leave, and special leave as provided in the 2001-2004 CBA;
3. All improvements that [the] parties may have agreed upon during the negotiations, are adopted as part of the CBA. All other demands, not passed upon herein, are deemed DENIED.
The parties are hereby directed, to submit a copy of the CBA incorporating the awards granted herein, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.[31]
As the above directive of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the decretal portion of the Decision dated June 8, 2005 has long been final and executory, the dispute on the matter of the provision on annual wage increase contra yearly lump sum payment is already moot.
Third, the petition is improper as it presents questions of fact. A question of fact cannot properly be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[32] This petition of the union now before this Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The existence of bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary.[33] The crucial question of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case, and good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts.[34] Thus, the issue of whether or not there was bad faith on the part of the company when it was bargaining with the union is a question of fact. It requires that the reviewing court look into the evidence to find if indeed there is proof that is substantial enough to show such bad faith.
The issue of whether there was already deadlock between the union and the company is likewise a question of fact. It requires the determination of evidence to find whether there is a "counteraction" of forces between the union and the company and whether each of the parties exerted "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining."[35] This is so because a deadlock is defined as follows:
A 'deadlock' is x x x the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage; x x x There is a deadlock when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed forces x x x. The word is synonymous with the word impasse, which x x x 'presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between the parties.'[36]
Considering that the issues presented by the union are factual issues, the union's petition is improper. As a rule, this Court cannot properly inquire into factual matters in the exercise of its judicial power under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, none of the exceptions apply in this case.
Fourth, and finally, assuming that this Court may disregard the conclusiveness of judgment and review the factual matters raised by the union, the merits are still not in the union's favor.
The findings of fact of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the Decision dated June 8, 2005 that there already existed a bargaining deadlock when she assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the union and the company, and that there was no bad faith on the part of the company when it was bargaining with the union are both supported by substantial evidence. This Court sees no reason to reverse or overturn the said findings.
The final and executory Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment squarely addressed the contention of the union that the company was guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The said Decision correctly characterized the nature of the duty to bargain, that is, it does not compel any party to accept a proposal or to make any concession.[37] While the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement between the employer and the employee's union resulting in a binding contract between the parties, the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does not mean lack of good faith. The laws invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract but do not compel one.[38] For after all, a CBA, like any contract is a product of mutual consent and not of compulsion. As such, the duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.[39] In this light, the corporation's unswerving position on the matter of annual lump sum payment in lieu of wage increase did not, by itself, constitute bad faith even if such position caused a stalemate in the negotiations, as correctly ruled by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the decision dated June 8, 2005.
As there was no bad faith on the part of the company in its bargaining with the union, deadlock was possible and did occur. The union's reliance on item 8 of the ground rules governing the parties' negotiations which required mutual consent for a declaration of deadlock was reduced to irrelevance by the actual facts. Contra factum non valet argumentum. There is no argument against facts. And the fact is that the negotiations between the union and the company were stalled by the opposing offers of yearly wage increase by the union, on the one hand, and annual lump sum payment by the company, on the other hand. Each party found the other's offer unacceptable and neither party was willing to yield. The company suggested seeking the assistance of a third party to settle the issue but the union preferred the remedy of filing a notice of strike. Each party was adamant in its position. Thus, because of the unresolved issue on wage increase, there was actually a complete stoppage of the ongoing negotiations between the parties and the union filed a Notice of Strike. A mutual declaration would neither add to nor subtract from the reality of the deadlock then existing between the parties. Thus, the absence of the parties' mutual declaration of deadlock does not mean that there was no deadlock. At most, it would have been simply a recognition of the prevailing status quo between the parties.
More importantly, the union only caused confusion in the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor and Employment when it questioned the latter's assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the union and the company on the ground that the "Secretary erred in assuming jurisdiction over the 'CBA' case when it [was] not the subject matter of the notice of strike" because the case was "all about 'ULP' in the form of bad faith bargaining." For the union, the Secretary of Labor and Employment should not have touched the issue of the CBA as there was no CBA deadlock at that time, and should have limited the assumption of jurisdiction to the charge of unfair labor practice for bargaining in bad faith.[40]
The union is wrong.
As discussed above, there was already an actual existing deadlock between the parties. What was lacking was the formal recognition of the existence of such a deadlock because the union refused a declaration of deadlock. Thus, the union's view that, at the time the Secretary of Labor and Employment exercised her power of assumption of jurisdiction, the issue of deadlock was neither an incidental issue to the matter of unfair labor practice nor an existing issue is incorrect.
More importantly, however, the union's mistaken theory that the deadlock issue was neither incidental nor existing is based on its premise that the case is all about the company's alleged unfair labor practice of bargaining in bad faith, which is the ground stated in its first Notice of Strike. In particular, the union asserts:
The evidentiary value of the Notice of Strike for ULP of BAD FAITH BARGAINING (Annex "M" of the petition) cannot be taken for granted. It is the very important documentary evidence that shows what is the existing "labor dispute" between the parties.[41]
While the first Notice of Strike is indeed significant in the determination of the existing labor dispute between the parties, it is not the sole criterion. As this Court explained in Union of Filipro Employees-Drug, Food and Allied Industries Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Nestle Philippines, Inc.[42]:
The Secretary of the DOLE has been explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. And, as a matter of necessity, it includes questions incidental to the labor dispute; that is, issues that are necessarily involved in the dispute itself, and not just to that ascribed in the Notice of Strike or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The totality of the company's Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction, including every allegation therein, also guided the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the proper determination of the labor dispute over which he or she was being asked to assume jurisdiction.
A "labor dispute" is defined under Article 212(l) of the Labor Code as follows:
ART. 212. Definitions. - x x x
x x x x
(l) "Labor dispute" includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
In this case, there was a dispute, an unresolved issue on several matters, between the union and the company in the course of the negotiations for a new CBA. Among the unsettled issues was the matter of compensation. In particular, paragraphs 1 to 6 of the statement of Antecedent Facts in the company's Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction[43] read:
1. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of the Company and the Union expired on 30 April 2004.
2. Thus, as early as 13 April 2004, the Company and the Union already met to discuss the ground rules that would govern their upcoming negotiations. Then, on 15 April 2004, the Union submitted its proposals for the renewal of their CBA.
3. While a total of 41 meetings were held between the parties, several items, including the matter of compensation, remained unresolved.
Copies of the Minutes of the 41 meetings are attached hereto and made integral part hereof as Annexes "A" to "A-40".
4. On 2 September 2004, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB, Region IV based in Calamba, Laguna anchored on a perceived unfair labor practice consisting of alleged bad faith bargaining on the part of the Company.
Although there is no basis to the charge of unfair labor practice as to give a semblance of validity to the notice of strike, the Company willingly and actually participated in the conciliation and mediation conferences called by the NCMB to settle the dispute.
A copy of the Notice of Strike is attached hereto and made integral part hereof as Annex "B".
5. Although conciliation meetings have been conducted by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) through Conciliator Leodegario Teodoro on 09 and 13 September 2004, no settlement of the dispute has yet been agreed upon.
6. Based on the attendant circumstances, as well as on the actuations of the Union officers and members, it is likely that the Union has already conducted, or is set to conduct soon, a strike vote.[44]
Thus, the labor dispute between the union and the company concerned the unresolved matters between the parties in relation to their negotiations for a new CBA. The power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over this dispute includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from the said dispute, such as, but not limited to the union's allegation of bad faith bargaining. It also includes and extends to the various unresolved provisions of the new CBA such as compensation, particularly the matter of annual wage increase or yearly lump sum payment in lieu of such wage increase, whether or not there was deadlock in the negotiations. Indeed, nowhere does the Order dated September 20, 2004 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment mention a CBA deadlock. What the union viewed as constituting the inclusion of a CBA deadlock in the assumption of jurisdiction was the inclusion of the economic issues, particularly the company's stance of yearly lump sum payment in lieu of annual wage increase, in the directive for the parties to submit their respective position papers.[45] The union's Motion for Reconsideration (With Urgent Prayer to Compel the Company to Justify Offer of Wage [Increase] Moratorium) and Second Motion for Reconsideration questioning the Order dated September 20, 2004 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment actually confirm that the labor dispute between the parties essentially and necessarily includes the conflicting positions of the union, which advocates annual wage increase, and of the company, which offers yearly lump sum payment in lieu of wage increase. In fact, that is the reason behind the union's prayer that the company be ordered to justify its offer of wage increase moratorium.[46] As there is already an existing controversy on the matter of wage increase, the Secretary of Labor and Employment need not wait for a deadlock in the negotiations to take cognizance of the matter. That is the significance of the power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. As this Court elucidated in Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International v. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment[47]:
Article 263(g) is both an extraordinary and a preemptive power to address an extraordinary situation - a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. This grant is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the term "assume jurisdiction" connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout; it includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from or related to the dispute, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. (Citation omitted.)
Everything considered, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment committed no abuse of discretion when she assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute of the union and the company.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 52-63; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring.
[2] Id. at 53.
[3] Id.
[4] Id. at 54.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 163.
[7] Id. at 54-55.
[8] Id. at 55.
[9] Id. at 168-172.
[10] Id. at 171-172.
[11] Id. at 59.
[12] Id. at 67-96.
[13] Id. at 76-79.
[14] G.R. No. 100158, June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA 565.
[15] Rollo, pp. 60-62.
[16] Id. at 62.
[17] Id. at 63.
[18] Id. at 63.
[19] Id. at 208-209.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 354-397, 360; Memorandum of the company in CA-G.R. SP No. 88178.
[21] Id. at 392-397.
[22] Rollo, pp. 295-302.
[23] 335 Phil. 170 (1997).
[24] Rollo, pp. 299-300.
[25] Id. at 300.
[26] Id. at 300-301.
[27] Id. at 262.
[28] Id. at 24-42.
[29] Id. at 244-262.
[30] 271 Phil. 768, 784 (1991).
[31] Rollo, pp. 301-302.
[32] Only questions of law should be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 (Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Minterbro-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor, G.R. No. 174300, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 28, 41).
[33] Belle Corporation v. De Leon-Banks, G.R. No. 174669, September 19, 2012, 681 SCRA 351, 362.
[34] Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, 346 Phil. 524, 534 (1997).
[35] See Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-Unified Filipino Service Workers v. Laguesma, supra note 23 at 179.
[36] Id. at 178-179, citing Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 91915, September 11, 1992, 213 SCRA 759, 773.
[37] In this connection, Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the duty to bargain collectively as follows:
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreements and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession. (Emphasis supplied.)
[38] Union of Filipro Employees-Drug, Food and Allied Industries Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., 571 Phil. 29, 41 (2008).
[39] Id.
[40] Rollo, p. 178.
[41] Id. at 118.
[42] Supra note 38 at 49.
[43] CA rollo, pp. 32-40.
[44] Id. at 33-34.
[45] See union's Motion for Reconsideration (With Urgent Prayer to Compel the Company to Justify Offer of Wage Moratorium) and Second Motion for Reconsideration, rollo, pp. 173-180 and 188-195, respectively.
[46] Id. at 180 and 195.
[47] G.R. No. 167401, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 185, 205-206.
[2014V421] Takata (Phils) Corp vs Bureau of Labor and SALAMAT
[2014V421] TAKATA (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND SAMAHANG LAKAS MANGGAGAWA NG TAKATA (SALAMAT), RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 196276
2014 Jun 4
3rd Division
Labor > Labor Relations Law > Union Registration
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner TAKATA Philippines Corporation assailing the Decision[1] dated December 22, 2010 and the Resolution[2] dated March 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112406.
On July 7, 2009, petitioner filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office a Petition[3] for Cancellation of the Certificate of Union Registration of Respondent Samahang Lakas Manggagawa ng Takata (SALAMAT) on the ground that the latter is guilty of misrepresentation, false statement and fraud with respect to the number of those who participated in the organizational meeting, the adoption and ratification of its Constitution and By-Laws, and in the election of its officers. It contended that in the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting of respondent, only 68 attendees signed the attendance sheet, and which number comprised only 17% of the total number of the 396 regular rank- and-file employees which respondent sought to represent, and hence, respondent failed to comply with the 20% minimum membership requirement. Petitioner insisted that the document "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon" bore no signatures of the alleged 119 union members; and that employees were not given sufficient information on the documents they signed; that the document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi" was not submitted at the time of the filing of respondent's application for union registration; that the 119 union members were actually only 117; and, that the total number of petitioner's employees as of May 1, 2009 was 470, and not 396 as respondent claimed.[4]
Respondent denied the charge and claimed that the 119 union members were more than the 20% requirement for union registration. The document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi sa Unyon" which it presented in its petition for certification election[5] supported their claim of 119 members. Respondent also contended that petitioner was estopped from assailing its legal personality as it agreed to a certification election and actively participated in the pre-election conference of the certification election proceedings.[6] Respondent argued that the union members were informed of the contents of the documents they signed and that the 68 attendees to the organizational meeting constituted more than 50% of the total union membership, hence, a quorum existed for the conduct of the said meeting.[7]
On August 27, 2009, DOLE Regional Director, Atty. Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr., issued a Decision[8] granting the petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the respondent Union Certificate of Registration No. RO400A-2009-05-01-UR-LAG, dated May 19, 2009 is hereby REVOCKED (sic) and /or CANCELLED pursuant to paragraph (a) & (b), Section 3, Rule XIV of Department Order No. 40-03 and the Samahang Lakas ng Manggagawa ng TAKATA (SALAMAT) is hereby delisted from the roll of legitimate labor organization of this office.[9]
In revoking respondent's certificate of registration, the Regional Director found that the 68 employees who attended the organizational meeting was obviously less than 20% of the total number of 396 regular rank-and-file employees which respondent sought to represent, hence, short of the union registration requirement; that the attendance sheet which contained the signatures and names of the union members totalling to 68 contradicted the list of names stated in the document denominated as "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon." The document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi" was not attached to the application for registration as it was only submitted in the petition for certification election filed by respondent at a later date. The Regional Director also found that the proceedings in the cancellation of registration and certification elections are two different and entirely separate and independent proceedings which were not dependent on each other.
Dissatisfied, respondent, through Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP) Paralegal Officer, Domingo P. Mole, filed a Notice and Memorandum of Appeal[10] with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). However, on September 28, 2009, respondent, through its counsels, Attys. Napoleon C. Banzuela, Jr. and Jehn Louie W. Velandrez, filed an Appeal Memorandum with Formal Entry of Appearance[11] to the Office of the DOLE Secretary, which the latter eventually referred to the BLR. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Appeals[12] praying for their dismissal on the ground of forum shopping as respondent filed two separate appeals in two separate venues; and for failing to avail of the correct remedy within the period; and that the certificate of registration was tainted with fraud, misrepresentation and falsification.
In its Answer,[13] respondent claimed that there was no forum shopping as BMP's Paralegal Officer was no longer authorized to file an appeal on behalf of respondent as the latter's link with BMP was already terminated and only the Union President was authorized to file the appeal; and that it complied with Department Order No. 40-03.
On December 9, 2009, after considering respondent's Appeal Memorandum with Formal Entry of Appearance and petitioner's Answer, the BLR rendered its Decision[14] reversing the Order of the Regional Director, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of Regional Director Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr., dated 27 August 2009, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Samahang Lakas Manggagawa ng TAKATA (SALAMAT) shall remain in the roster of labor organizations.[15]
In reversing, the BLR found that petitioner failed to prove that respondent deliberately and maliciously misrepresented the number of rank-and-file employees. It pointed out petitioner's basis for the alleged non-compliance with the minimum membership requirement for registration was the attendance of 68 members to the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting supposedly comprising only 17% of the total 396 regular rank-and-file employees. However, the BLR found that the list of employees who participated in the organizational meeting was a separate and distinct requirement from the list of the names of members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit; and that there was no requirement for signatures opposite the names of the union members; and there was no evidence showing that the employees assailed their inclusion in the list of union members.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the BLR in a Resolution[16] dated January 8, 2010.
Undaunted, petitioner went to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
After the submission of the parties' respective pleadings, the case was submitted for decision.
On December 22, 2010, the CA rendered its assailed decision which denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the BLR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated March 29, 2011.
Hence this petition for review filed by petitioner raising the following issues, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT BLR AND NOT FINDING ANY VIOLATION BY SAMAHANG LAKAS MANGGAGAWA SA TAKATA (SALAMAT ) OF THE RULE ON FORUM SHOPPING IN THE FILING OF TWO VERIFIED APPEALS FOR AND ITS BEHALF. BOTH OF THE APPEALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHT BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT BLR, ON GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF SAMAHANG LAKAS MANGGAGAWA SA TAKATA (SALAMAT) WAS COMPLIANT WITH THE LAW. CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN THE REGISTRATION OF SALAMAT, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SAME IS TAINTED WITH FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION AND FALSIFICATION. SALAMAT DID NOT POSSESS THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF MEMBERS AT THE TIME OF FILING OF ITS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION, HENCE, IT SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF MISREPRESENTATION , AND FALSE STATEMENTS AND FRAUD IN CONNECTION THEREWITH.[17]
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that respondent had filed two separate appeals with two different representations at two different venues, in violation of the rule on multiplicity of suits and forum shopping, and instead of dismissing both appeals, the appeal erroneously filed before the Labor Secretary was the one held validly filed, entertained and even granted; that it is not within the discretion of BLR to choose which between the two appeals should be entertained, as it is the fact of the filing of the two appeals that is being prohibited and not who among the representatives therein possessed the authority.
We are not persuaded.
We find no error committed by the CA in finding that respondent committed no forum shopping. As the CA correctly concluded, to wit:
It is undisputed that BMP Paralegal Officer Domingo P. Mole was no longer authorized to file an appeal on behalf of union SALAMAT and that BMP was duly informed that its services was already terminated. SALAMAT even submitted before the BLR its "Resolusyon Blg. 01-2009" terminating the services of BMP and revoking the representation of Mr. Domingo Mole in any of the pending cases being handled by him on behalf of the union. So, considering that BMP Paralegal Officer Domingo P. Mole was no longer authorized to file an appeal when it filed the Notice and Memorandum of Appeal to DOLE Regional Office No. IV-A, the same can no longer be treated as an appeal filed by union SALAMAT. Hence, there is no forum shopping to speak of in this case as only the Appeal Memorandum with Formal Entry of Appearance filed by Atty. Napoleon C. Banzuela, Jr. and Atty. Jehn Louie W. Velandrez is sanctioned by SALAMAT.[18]
Since Mole's appeal filed with the BLR was not specifically authorized by respondent, such appeal is considered to have not been filed at all. It has been held that "if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect."[19]
Respondent through its authorized representative filed its Appeal Memorandum with Formal Entry of Appearance before the Labor Secretary, and not with the BLR. As the appeal emanated from the petition for cancellation of certificate of registration filed with the Regional Office, the decision canceling the registration is appealable to the BLR, and not with the Labor Secretary. However, since the Labor Secretary motu propio referred the appeal with the BLR, the latter can now act on it. Considering that Mole's appeal with the BLR was not deemed filed, respondent's appeal, through Banzuela and Associates, which the Labor Secretary referred to the BLR was the only existing appeal with the BLR for resolution. There is, therefore, no merit to petitioner's claim that BLR chose the appeal of Banzuela and Associates over Mole's appeal.
The case of Abbott Laboratories Philippines, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories Employees Union[20] cited by petitioner is not at all applicable in this case as the issue therein is the authority of the Labor Secretary to review the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over decision of the Regional Director in cases involving cancellations of certificate of registration of labor unions. We found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Secretary of Labor in not acting on therein petitioner's appeal. The decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations on cases brought before it on appeal from the Regional Director are final and executory. Hence, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 and the Rules of Court. In this case, after the Labor Secretary motu propio referred respondent's appeal filed with it to the BLR which rendered its decision reversing the Regional Director, petitioner went directly to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
As to the second issue, petitioner seeks the cancellation of respondent's registration on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation bearing on the minimum requirement of the law as to its membership, considering the big disparity in numbers, between the organizational meeting and the list of members, and so misleading the BLR that it obtained the minimum required number of employees for purposes of organization and registration.
We find no merit in the arguments.
Art. 234 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 234. Requirements of Registration. - A federation, national union or industry or trade union center or an independent union shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements: (a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee; (b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings; (c) In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate; (d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and (e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the members who participated in it."
And after the issuance of the certificate of registration, the labor organization's registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code. And the cancellation of union certificate of registration and the grounds thereof are as follows:
ART. 238. Cancellation of Registration. - The certificate of registration of any legitimate labor organization, whether national or local, may be cancelled by the Bureau, after due hearing, only on the grounds specified in Article 239 hereof.
ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration. - The following may constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration: (a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification; (b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of voters; (c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.
Petitioner's charge that respondent committed misrepresentation and fraud in securing its certificate of registration is a serious charge and must be carefully evaluated. Allegations thereof should be compounded with supporting circumstances and evidence.[21] We find no evidence on record to support petitioner's accusation.
Petitioner's allegation of misrepresentation and fraud is based on its claim that during the organizational meeting on May 1, 2009, only 68 employees attended, while respondent claimed that it has 119 members as shown in the document denominated as "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon;" hence, respondent misrepresented on the 20% requirement of the law as to its membership.
We do not agree.
It does not appear in Article 234 (b) of the Labor Code that the attendees in the organizational meeting must comprise 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit. In fact, even the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code does not so provide. It is only under Article 234 (c) that requires the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate. Clearly, the 20% minimum requirement pertains to the employees' membership in the union and not to the list of workers who participated in the organizational meeting. Indeed, Article 234 (b) and (c) provide for separate requirements, which must be submitted for the union's registration, and which respondent did submit. Here, the total number of employees in the bargaining unit was 396, and 20% of which was about 79. Respondent submitted a document entitled "Pangalan ng Mga Kasapi ng Unyon" showing the names of 119 employees as union members, thus respondent sufficiently complied even beyond the 20% minimum membership requirement. Respondent also submitted the attendance sheet of the organizational meeting which contained the names and signatures of the 68 union members who attended the meeting. Considering that there are 119 union members which are more than 20% of all the employees of the bargaining unit, and since the law does not provide for the required number of members to attend the organizational meeting, the 68 attendees which comprised at least the majority of the 119 union members would already constitute a quorum for the meeting to proceed and to validly ratify the Constitution and By-laws of the union. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner to contend that grounds exist for the cancellation of respondent's union registration. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under Article 239 of the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.[22]
Petitioner's claim that the alleged union members signed documents without adequate information is not persuasive. The one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.[23] In fact, we note that not one of those listed in the document denominated as "Pangalan ng Mga Kasapi ng Unyon" had come forward to deny their membership with respondent. Notably, it had not been rebutted that the same union members had signed the document entitled "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi," thus, strengthening their desire to be members of the respondent union.
Petitioner claims that in the list of members, there was an employee whose name appeared twice and another employee who was merely a project employee. Such could not be considered a misrepresentation in the absence of showing that respondent deliberately did so for the purpose of increasing their union membership. In fact, even if those two names were not included in the list of union members, there would still be 117 members which was still more than 20% of the 396 rank-and-file employees.
As to petitioner's argument that the total number of its employees as of May 1, 2009 was 470, and not 396 as respondent claimed, still the 117 union members comprised more than the 20% membership requirement for respondent's registration.
In Mariwasa Siam Ceramics v. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment,[24] we said:
For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with the election of officers, the minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.
The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting would not, to our mind, provide a valid reason to cancel respondent's certificate of registration. The cancellation of a union's registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.
In this case, we agree with the BLR and the CA that respondent could not have possibly committed misrepresentation, fraud, or false statements. The alleged failure of respondent to indicate with mathematical precision the total number of employees in the bargaining unit is of no moment, especially as it was able to comply with the 20% minimum membership requirement. Even if the total number of rank-and-file employees of petitioner is 528, while respondent declared that it should only be 455, it still cannot be denied that the latter would have more than complied with the registration requirement. [25]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated December 22, 2010 and the Resolution dated March 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 112406, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr.,* Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
June 27, 2014
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on ___June 4, 2014___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on June 27, 2014 at 1:20 p.m.
Very truly yours, (SGD) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN Division Clerk of Court
* Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1691, dated May 22, 2014.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino, with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 328-336.
[2] Id. at 375-376.
[3] Id. at 48-67.
[4] Annex "D," Reply to Comment, id. at 73-83.
[5] Docketed as RO400-A- 0905- LAG -RU -004
[6] Rollo, pp. 68-72.
[7] Id. at 84-89.
[8] Id. at 90-98; Docketed as RO400-A-0904-RFO-AU-001.
[9] Id. at 98.
[10] Id. at 99-107.
[11] Id. at 108-119.
[12] Id. at 120-186.
[13] Id. at 187-189.
[14] Id. at 191-196; Per Director IV Rebecca C. Chato; Docketed as BLR-A-C-43-10-1-09.
[15] Id. at 196. (Emphasis in the original)
[16] Id. at 233-234.
[17] Id. at 17-18.
[18] Id. at 333.
[19] Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, 486 Phil. 729, 741 (2004).
[20] 380 Phil. 364 (2000).
[21] San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-Phil. Transport and General Workers Org. v. San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union-Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino, 559 Phil. 549, 566-567 (2007).
[22] Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 183317, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 706, 716 (2009).
[23] P.T. Cerna Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91622, April 6, 1993, 221 SCRA 19, 25.
[24] Supra note 22.
* UtakPinoy.Com Software *
[25] Id. at 715-716.
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