The Literal Meaning Of Its Stipulations Shall Prevail

[2014V693] BENSON INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP AND/OR VILMA GENON, EDISA HORTELANO, LOURDES ARANAS, TONY FORMENTERA, RENEBOY LEYSON, MA. ALONA ACALDO, MA. CONCEPCION ABAO, TERESITA CALINAWAN, NICIFORO CABANSAG, STELLA BARONGO, MARILYN POTOT, WELMER ABANID, LORENZO ALIA, LINO PARADERO, DIOSDADO ANDALES, LUCENA ABESIA, AND ARMANDO YBAÑEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. BENSON INDUSTRIES, INC., RESPONDENT.


G.R. No. 200746
2014 Aug 6
2nd Division
Labor > Labor Standards > CBA, Wages

D E C I S I O N

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated September 27, 2011 and the Resolution[3] dated January 31, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03842 which reversed and set aside the Decision[4] dated October 24, 2008 of the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), and accordingly deleted the award to petitioners Vilma Genon, Edisa Hortelano, Lourdes Aranas, Tony Formentera, Reneboy Leyson, Ma. Alona Acaldo, Ma. Concepcion Abao, Teresita Calinawan, Niciforo Cabansag, Stella Barongo, Marilyn Potot, Welmer Abanid, Lorenzo Alia, Lino Paradero, Diosdado Andales, Lucena Abesia, and Armando Ybañez (petitioners) of additional separation pay equivalent to four (4) days of work for every year of service.

The Facts

Respondent Benson Industries, Inc. (Benson) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing of green coils with the brand name Lion-Tiger Mosquito Killer. On February 12, 2008, Benson sent its employees, including herein petitioners, a notice[5] informing them of their intended termination from employment, to be effected on March 15, 2008 on the ground of closure and/or cessation of business operations. In consequence, the majority of Benson's employees resigned.[6] Meanwhile, petitioners, through Benson Industries Employees Union-ALU-TUCP (Union), filed a notice of strike, claiming that the company's supposed closure was merely a ploy to replace the union members with lower paid workers, and, as a result, increase its profit at their expense.[7] The strike did not, however, push through due to the parties' amicable settlement during the conciliation proceedings before the NCMB, whereby petitioners accepted Benson's payment of separation pay, computed at 15 days for every year of service, as per the parties' Memorandum of Agreement[8] dated April 9, 2008.[9]

This notwithstanding, petitioners proffered a claim for the payment of additional separation pay at the rate of four (4) days for every year of service. As basis, petitioners invoked Section 1, Article VIII of the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) executed by and between the Union and Benson which states that "[Benson] shall pay to any employee/laborer who is terminated from the service without any fault attributable to him, a 'Separation Pay' equivalent to not less than nineteen (19) days' pay for every year of service based upon the latest rate of pay of the employee/laborer concerned."[10] Benson opposed petitioners' claim, averring that the separation pay already paid to them was already more than what the law requires. Reaching an impasse on the conflict, the parties referred the issue to voluntary arbitration, wherein the validity of Benson's closure was brought up as well.[11]

The VA Ruling

In a Decision[12] dated October 24, 2008 (October 24, 2008 VA Decision), the VA ruled in favor of petitioners, and, thus, ordered Benson to pay each of them separation benefits in "an amount equivalent to four (4) days for every year of service based on the latest rate of pay of the [individual petitioner] concerned subject to whatever legally valid deductions chargeable against [said individual petitioner] whenever applicable."[13]

The VA ratiocinated that in computing the amount of separation benefits due to petitioners, the basis should be the provision of the existing CBA between Benson and the Union which explicitly states that should the employees be terminated through no fault of their own, they should be awarded separation benefits at the rate of 19 days for every year of service. In this regard, the VA opined that the provisions of the CBA should be given effect because it expresses the latest agreement of the union and the company, not to mention the fact that it gives more benefits to the employees.[14]

Separately, the VA found adequate proof to support Benson's position that it was indeed in a state of insolvency, which, therefore, justified its closure and/or cessation of business operations on the ground of serious business losses and/or financial reverses.[15]

Dissatisfied, Benson elevated the matter on appeal before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[16] dated September 27, 2011, the CA reversed and set aside the VA's ruling, and accordingly deleted the award of additional separation benefits equivalent to four (4) days of work for every year of service. It held that despite the express provision in the CBA stating that Benson should pay its employees who were terminated without their fault separation benefits equivalent to at least 19 days' pay for every year of service, Benson cannot be compelled to do so considering its current financial status.[17]

Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution[18] dated January 31, 2012, hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly deleted the award to petitioners of additional separation benefits equivalent to four (4) days of work for every year of service.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

Closure of business may be considered as a reversal of an employer's fortune whereby there is a complete cessation of business operations and/or an actual locking-up of the doors of the establishment, usually due to financial losses. Under the Labor Code, it is treated as an authorized cause for termination, aimed at preventing further financial drain upon an employer who cannot anymore pay its employees since business has already stopped. As a form of recompense, the employer is required to pay its employees separation benefits, except when the closure is due to serious business losses.[19] Article 297 (formerly Article 283)[20] of the Labor Code, as amended, states this rule:

Art. 297. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, x x x. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While serious business losses generally exempt the employer from paying separation benefits, it must be pointed that the exemption only pertains to the obligation of the employer under Article 297 of the Labor Code. This is because of the law's express parameter that mandates payment of separation benefits "in case of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses." The policy distinction underlying Article 297 - that is, the distinction between closures due to serious business losses and those which are not - was deftly discussed by the Court in the case of Cama v. Joni's Food Services, Inc.,[21] as follows:

The Constitution, while affording full protection to labor, nonetheless, recognizes "the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth." In line with this protection afforded to business by the fundamental law, Article 283 [(now, Article 297)] of the Labor Code clearly makes a policy distinction. It is only in instances of "retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses" that employees whose employment has been terminated as a result are entitled to separation pay. In other words, Article 283 [(now, Article 297)] of the Labor Code does not obligate an employer to pay separation benefits when the closure is due to serious losses. To require an employer to be generous when it is no longer in a position to do so, in our view, would be unduly oppressive, unjust, and unfair to the employer. Ours is a system of laws, and the law in protecting the rights of the working man, authorizes neither the oppression nor the self-destruction of the employer. x x x.[22] (Emphasis supplied)

When the obligation to pay separation benefits, however, is not sourced from law (particularly, Article 297 of the Labor Code), but from contract,[23] such as an existing collective bargaining agreement between the employer and its employees, an examination of the latter's provisions becomes necessary in order to determine the governing parameters for the said obligation. To reiterate, an employer which closes shop due to serious business losses is exempt from paying separation benefits under Article 297 of the Labor Code for the reason that the said provision explicitly requires the same only when the closure is not due to serious business losses; conversely, the obligation is maintained when the employer's closure is not due to serious business losses. For a similar exemption to obtain against a contract, such as a CBA, the tenor of the parties' agreement ought to be similar to the law's tenor. When the parties, however, agree to deviate therefrom, and unqualifiedly covenant the payment of separation benefits irrespective of the employer's financial position, then the obligatory force of that contract prevails and its terms should be carried out to its full effect. Verily, it is fundamental that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and thus should be complied with in good faith;[24] and parties are bound by the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions they have agreed to, the only limitation being that these stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions are not contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy.[25] Hence, if the terms of a CBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail.[26] As enunciated in Honda Phils., Inc. v. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda:[27]

A collective bargaining agreement refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.[28]

In this case, it is undisputed that a CBA was forged by the employer, Benson, and its employees, through the Union, to govern their relations effective July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2010. It is equally undisputed that Benson agreed to and was thus obligated under the CBA to pay its employees who had been terminated without any fault attributable to them separation benefits at the rate of 19 days for every year of service. This is particularly found in Section 1, Article VIII of the same contract, to wit:

Section 1. Separation Pay - The Company shall pay to any employee/laborer who is terminated from the service without any fault attributable to him, a "Separation Pay" equivalent to not less than nineteen (19) days' pay for every year of service based upon the latest rate of pay of the employee/laborer concerned.[29]

As may be gleaned from the following whereas clauses in a Memorandum of Agreement[30] dated November 20, 2003 between the parties, Benson had been fully aware of its distressed financial condition even at the time of the previous CBA (effective from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2005):

WHEREAS, on February 01, 2001 the Company and the Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with effectivity from July 01, 2000 to June 30, 2005;

x x x x

WHEREAS, the Company and the Union recognize that the Philippines is at present in grave economic crisis;

WHEREAS, the Union recognizes and acknowledges that the Company in particular is in grave financial difficulties and that the Company is hard up to meet its financial obligations to creditor banks that said creditor banks have even threatened to foreclose the mortgages on and to seize the Company's factory, realties, machineries and assets and in fact, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, one of the creditor banks scheduled on November 17, 1998 a foreclosure sale of the Company's factory, realties, machineries and assets in Extrajudicial Foreclosure Case No. EJF-2773-CEB;

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Benson even admits in its Comment that it was already saddled with loan from banks as early as 1997[31] and that it had been unable to service its loan obligations.[32] And yet, nothing appears on record to discount the fact that it still unqualifiedly and freely agreed to the separation pay provision in the July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2010 CBA, its distressed financial condition notwithstanding.

Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court disagrees with the CA in negating Benson's obligation to pay petitioners their full separation benefits under the said agreement. The postulation that Benson had closed its establishment and ceased operations due to serious business losses cannot be accepted as an excuse to clear itself of any liability since the ground of serious business losses is not, unlike Article 297 of the Labor Code, considered as an exculpatory parameter under the aforementioned CBA. Clearly, Benson, with full knowledge of its financial situation, freely and voluntarily entered into such agreement with petitioners. Hence, having failed to show that the subject CBA provision on separation benefits is contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy, or that the same can be interpreted as one with a condition - for instance, that the parties actually contemplated non-payment of separation benefits in the event of closure due to serious business losses - the Court is constrained to reinstate the October 24, 2008 VA Decision ordering Benson to pay each of the petitioners separation benefits in "an amount equivalent to four (4) days for every year of service based on the latest rate of pay of the [individual petitioner] concerned, subject to whatever legally valid deductions chargeable against [said individual petitioner], whenever applicable."[33]

Analogous to the foregoing is the Court's disquisition in Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association,[34] whereby the employer therein was held liable for the payment of Christmas bonus benefits, considering that the grant thereof was voluntarily and unqualifiedly agreed upon by the parties under the CBA despite the employer's full awareness of its distressed financial position (as Benson in this case), viz.:

It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. This principle stands strong and true in the case at bar.

A reading of the provision of the CBA reveals that the same provides for the giving of a "Christmas gift package/bonus" without qualification. Terse and clear, the said provision did not state that the Christmas package shall be made to depend on the petitioner's financial standing. The records are also bereft of any showing that the petitioner made it clear during the CBA negotiations that the bonus was dependent on any condition. Indeed, if the petitioner and respondent Association intended that the P3,000.00 bonus would be dependent on the company earnings, such intention should have been expressed in the CBA.

It is noteworthy that in petitioner's 1998 and 1999 financial Statements, it took note that "the 1997 financial crisis in the Asian region adversely affected the Philippine economy."

From the foregoing, petitioner cannot insist on business losses as a basis for disregarding its undertaking. It is manifestly clear that petitioner was very much aware of the imminence and possibility of business losses owing to the 1997 financial crisis. In 1998, petitioner suffered a net loss of P14,347,548.00. Yet it gave a P3,000.00 bonus to the members of the Association. In 1999, when petitioner's very own financial statement reflected that "the positive developments in the economy have yet to favorably affect the operations of the company," and reported a loss of P346,025,733.00, it entered into the CBA with the respondent Association whereby it contracted to grant a Christmas gift package/bonus to the latter. Petitioner supposedly continued to incur losses on the years 2000 and 2001. Still and all, this did not deter it from honoring the CBA provision on Christmas bonus as it continued to give P3,000.00 each to the members of the respondent Association in the years 1999, 2000 and 2001.

All given, business losses are a feeble ground for petitioner to repudiate its obligation under the CBA. The rule is settled that any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare and to afford labor full protection.

Hence, absent any proof that petitioner's consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, it is presumed that it entered into the CBA voluntarily and had full knowledge of the contents thereof and was aware of its commitments under the contract.[35] (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

A similar disposition was also made in the case of Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Eastern Telecoms Employees Union,[36] wherein the Court held as follows:

The parties to the contract must be presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable developments. It is, therefore, only in absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances that equity demands assistance for the debtor. In the case at bench, the Court determines that ETPI's claimed depressed financial state will not release it from the binding effect of the 2001-2004 CBA Side Agreement.

ETPI appears to be well aware of its deteriorating financial condition when it entered into the 2001-2004 CBA Side Agreement with ETEU and obliged itself to pay bonuses to the members of ETEU. Considering that ETPI had been continuously suffering huge losses from 2000 to 2002, its business losses in the year 2003 were not exactly unforeseen or unexpected. Consequently, it cannot be said that the difficulty in complying with its obligation under the Side Agreement was "manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties." Besides, as held in Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement does not discharge a contractual obligation. Contracts, once perfected, are binding between the contracting parties. Obligations arising therefrom have the force of law and should be complied with in good faith. ETPI cannot renege from the obligation it has freely assumed when it signed the 2001-2004 CBA Side Agreement.[37] (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

To quell any doubts, it bears pointing out that the CA's reliance on Galaxie Steel Workers Union (GSWU-NAFLU-KMU) v. NLRC[38] and Cama v. Joni's Food Services, Inc.[39] was actually misplaced since no CBA was involved in those cases. As such, consistent with the parameters of Article 297 of the Labor Code as above-discussed, the payment of separation benefits in view of the employer's serious business losses in those cases was not in order. In the same light, North Davao Mining Corporation v. NLRC[40] was speciously applied by the CA given that the payment of separation benefits in that case was not sourced from a contractual CBA obligation but merely from a unilateral company practice which was deemed as an act of generosity on the part of the employer. It was in this context that the Court held that "to require [the company] to continue being generous when it is no longer in a position to do so would certainly be unduly oppressive, unfair and most revolting to the conscience."[41] The factual dissimilarity of these cases to Benson and petitioners' situation therefore precludes the application of the same ruling.

Accordingly, finding no cogent reason for Benson not to comply with its obligations under the July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2010 CBA, and considering further that the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor should be interpreted in favor of labor,[42] the Court hereby reverses the CA Decision and reinstates the October 24, 2008 VA Decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 27, 2011 and the Resolution dated January 31, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03842 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 24, 2008 of the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 5-26.

[2] Id. at 31-39. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., concurring.

[3] Id. at 41-42.

[4] Id. at 253-260. Penned by Voluntary Arbitrator Manuel P. Legaspi.

[5] Id. at 60-62.

[6] See id. at 43-44.

[7] See id. at 33 and 52.

[8] Id. at 63.

[9] See id. at 44.

[10] Id. at 255.

[11] See id. at 254-255.

[12] Id. at 253-260.

[13] Id. at 50.

[14] Id. at 255.

[15] See id. at 255-260.

[16] Id. at 31-39.

[17] See id. at 35-38.

[18] Id. at 41-42.

[19] See Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. v. Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. Employees Union - Olalia, G.R. No. 173154 and G.R. No. 173229, December 9, 2013; citations omitted.

[20] As amended and renumbered by Republic Act No. 10151, entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHT WORKERS, THEREBY REPEALING ARTICLES 130 AND 131 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBER FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-TWO, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES."

[21] 469 Phil. 223 (2004).

[22] Id. at 235-236.

[23] Article 1157 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1157. Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasi-delicts. (Emphases supplied) [24] Prisma Construction & Development Corporation v. Menchavez, G.R. No. 160545, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 590, 597.

[25] Id. at 601.

[26] Supreme Steel Corporation v. Nagkakaisang Manggagawa Ng Supreme Independent Union (NMS-IND-APL), G.R. No. 185556, March 28, 2011, 646 SCRA 501, 521.

[27] G.R. No. 145561, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 186.

[28] Id. at 190-191.

[29] Rollo, p. 255.

[30] Id. at 415-418.

[31] Id. at 455.

[32] Id.

[33] Id. at 260.

[34] G.R. No. 180866, March 2, 2010, 614 SCRA 63.

[35] Id. at 73-74.

[36] G.R. No. 185665, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 516.

[37] Id. at 531-532.

[38] 535 Phil. 675 (2006).

[39] Supra note 21.

[40] G.R. No. 112546, March 13, 1996, 254 SCRA 721.

[41] Id. at 730.

[42] LABOR CODE, Article 4.

Money-Claim Underpayment Of Retirement Benefits

[2014V656] UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY UNION, PETITIONER, VS. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 203957
2014 July 30
2nd Division

Labor > Labor Relations Law > CBA

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 203957 is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] promulgated on 13 July 2012 as well as the Resolution[3] promulgated on 19 October 2012 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120970. The CA set aside the 8 June 2011 Decision[4] and 29 July 2011 Resolution[5]

of the Fourth Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 10-003370-08, as well as the 24 September 2010 Decision[6] of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC-NCR Case No. 09-09745-07.

In its 24 September 2010 decision, the LA ordered the University of Santo Tomas (UST) to remit P18,000,000.00 to the hospitalization and medical benefits fund (fund) pursuant to the mandate of the 1996-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The LA also ordered UST to pay 10% of the total monetary award as attorney's fees. The other claims were dismissed for lack of merit.

In its 8 June 2011 decision, the NLRC ordered UST to remit to the University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) the amounts of P80,000,000.00 for the fund pursuant to the CBA and P8,000,000.00 as attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award. The NLRC denied UST's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

In its 13 July 2012 decision, the CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC and granted UST's petition. The CA set aside the decisions of the NLRC and the LA, without prejudice to the refiling of USTFU's complaint in the proper forum. The CA denied USTFU's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The Facts

The CA recited the facts as follows:

In a letter dated February 6, 2007, [USTFU] demanded from [UST], through its Rector, Fr. Ernesto M. Arceo, O.P. ("Fr. Arceo"), remittance of the total amount of P65,000,000.00 plus legal interest thereon, representing deficiency in its contribution to the medical and hospitalization fund ("fund") of [UST's] faculty members. [USTFU] also sent [UST] a letter dated February 26, 2007, accompanied by a summary of its claims pursuant to their 1996-2001 CBA.

On March 2, 2007, Fr. Arceo informed [USTFU] that the aforesaid benefits were not meant to be given annually but rather as a one-time allocation or contribution to the fund. [USTFU] then sent [UST] another demand letter dated June 24, 2007 reiterating its position that [UST] is obliged to remit to the fund, its contributions not only for the years 1996-1997 but also for the subsequent years, but to no avail.

Thus, on September 5, 2007 [USTFU] filed against [UST], a complaint for unfair labor practice, as well as for moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees before the arbitration branch of the NLRC.

[UST] sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It contended that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators because it involves the interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the CBA; and the conflict between the herein parties must be resolved as grievance under the CBA and not as unfair labor practice.

[UST's] motion to dismiss was denied by the LA in its August 8, 2008 order. [UST] appealed the Order to the NLRC. The NLRC Seventh Division, however, dismissed the appeal on May 12, 2009 and remanded the case to the LA for further proceedings.

The NLRC, in its assailed decision, correctly summarized the issues and submissions of the herein parties in their respective position papers, as follows:

According to [UST], the parties had, in the past, concluded several Collective Bargaining Agreements for the mutual benefit of the union members and [UST], and one of these agreements was the 1996-2001 CBA. It is undisputed that one of the economic benefits granted by [UST] under the said CBA was the "Hospitalization Fund," provided under Section 1-A(4) of the Article XIII thereof, the pertinent provisions of which state:

ARTICLE XIII ECONOMIC BENEFITS

Section 1. ECONOMIC BENEFIT- Upon ratification and approval and for the term of this Agreement, the economic benefits to be granted by the UNIVERSITY and the schedule of such releases are as follows:

A. School Year 1996-97 (June 1, 1996 to May 31, 1997):

x x x

4. Hospitalization Fund: Upon ratification and approval hereof, the UNIVERSITY shall establish a perpetual hospitalization and medical benefits fund in the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000) to be managed conjointly by a hospitalization and medical benefits committee where both management and union are equally represented.

x x x

B. School Year 1997-98 (June 1, 1997-May 31, 1998);

x x x

2. Hospitalization Fund: The UNIVERSITY shall contribute the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000) to augment the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits fund. The said sum shall be added to the remaining balance of the aforementioned fund;

x x x

C. School Year 1998-99 (June 1, 1998-May 31, 1999);

x x x

2. Hospitalization Fund: The UNIVERSITY shall contribute the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000) to augment the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund. The said sum shall be added to the remaining balance of the aforementioned fund;

D. Miscellaneous Provisions:

x x x

2. All the economic benefits herein given and those elsewhere provided under this agreement, other than retirement benefits and one-half of the signing bonus, are chargeable to the tuition fee share, if any, of the faculty members;

x x x x x x x x x

[USTFU] added that the amount of four (4) million pesos was agreed to be paid by the University to the Hospitalization Fund annually for the fourth and fifth year of their CBA, pursuant to the parties' Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which embodied the renegotiated economic provisions of the said CBA for the years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001.

According to [USTFU], Section D(2) of the 1996-2001 CBA provides that: 'All the economic benefits herein given and those elsewhere provided under this agreement, other than retirement benefits and one-half of the signing bonus, are chargeable to the tuition fee share, if any, of the faculty members.' [USTFU] explained that the rationale for the above-quoted provision is that the economic benefits under the said CBA like the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund, are sourced from the tuition fee increases and pursuant thereto, [UST] is obligated to remit the amount of P2,000,000.00 not only in the first year of the CBA (1996-1997) but also in the subsequent years because the said amount became an integral part of the current or existing tuition fee. Furthermore, [UST] is likewise obligated to slide in the amounts allocated for the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund for the succeeding years to the next CBA year and so on and so forth. [USTFU] claimed that the tuition fee increase once integrated to the old amount of tuition fee becomes and remains an integral part of the existing tuition fee.

[USTFU] averred that while [UST] remitted the amount of P2,000,000.00 during the first year of the 1996-2001 CBA, [UST] did not slide-in or remit the said amount in the succeeding year (1997-1998). [UST] only remitted the amount of P1,000.000,000.00 [sic] for the CBA year 1998-1999. Moreover, [UST] remitted only the amount of P1,000,000.00 on the third year of the CBA instead of P4,000,000.00 (2 Million + 1 Million + 1 Million). And though [UST] remitted the amount of P4,000,000 during the fourth year (2) [sic] of the 1996-2001 CBA, it did not remit any amount at all during the fifth year of the said Agreement.

[USTFU] claimed that during the period of the 1996-2001 CBA, [UST] should have remitted the total amount of P25,000,000.00 instead of P8,000,000.00 only. Thus, a deficiency of P17,000,000.00. [USTFU's] assertion is based on the following illustration:

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Actual Total 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 amount amount to remitted [be] remitted

2M remitted 2M did not slide 2M did not slide 2M did not slide 2M did not slide 2M 10M

1M remitted 1M did not slide 1M did not slide 1M did not slide 1M 4M 1M remitted 1M did not slide 1M did not slide 1M 3M

4M remitted 4M did not slide 4M 8M

Total 8M 25M

[USTFU] added that after the fifth year of the CBA, i.e. 2001 onwards, [UST] ought to remit the amount of P8,000,000.00 ([2]M+1M+1M+4M) annually to the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund. Hence, for the school year 2001-2002 up to the school year 2005-2006, an additional amount of P24,000,000.00 (8M x 3) should have been remitted by [UST] to the aforesaid fund. All in all, the total amount yet to be remitted had ballooned to P81,000,000.00.

Furthermore, [USTFU] averred that [UST] likewise failed and refused to render a proper accounting of the monies it paid or released to the covered faculty as well as the money it received as tuition fee increase starting from school year 1997-1998 onwards thereby violating Section D (1), Article XIII of the 1996-2001 CBA which provides that: 'At the end of this agreement, and within three (3) months therefrom, the UNIVERSITY shall render an accounting of the monies it paid or released to the covered faculty in consequence hereof.' On the other hand, [UST] claimed that it religiously complied with the economic provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA particularly its obligation to remit to the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund as the renegotiated economic provisions under the MOA by remitting the total amount of P8,000,000.00. [UST] claimed that it was never the intention of the parties to the CBA that the amounts deposited to the Hospitalization fund for each year shall be carried over to the succeeding years. UST added that the MOA likewise made no mention that the amount of P4,000,000.00 corresponding to the school year 1999-2000 should be carried over to the next school year. Thus, it was safe to conclude that the clear intention of the parties was that the amounts indicated on the CBA should only be remitted once on the scheduled school year. Accordingly, [UST] averred that it was not guilty of unfair labor practice.

[UST] further argued that the claim of [USTFU] had already been barred by prescription since under Article 290 of the Labor Code all unfair labor practice [cases] should be filed within one (1) year from the accrual thereof otherwise they shall forever be barred. And assuming that the instance [sic] case may be considered as a money claim, the same already prescribed after three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued.

Finally, [UST] maintained that the present dispute should not be treated as unfair labor practice but should be resolved as a grievance under the CBA and referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator.

The parties thereafter submitted their respective Replies and Rejoinders amplifying their arguments while refuting those made by the other.[7]

The Labor Arbiter's Ruling

The LA ruled in favor of USTFU. The LA classified USTFU's complaint as one for "unfair labor practice, claims for sliding in of funds to hospitalization and medical benefits under the CBA, damages and attorney's fee with prayer for slide-in and restoration of medical benefits under the CBA."[8] The LA ruled that UST was not able to comply with Article XIII, Section 1A-(4) of the 1996-2001 CBA. However, despite UST's alleged non-compliance, the LA ruled that UST did not commit unfair labor practice.

The LA interpreted the pertinent CBA provisions to mean that UST bound itself to contribute to the fund P2,000,000.00 every school year, regardless of the appropriated augmentation amount. The LA computed UST's liability in this manner:

Considering that the pertinent provision of the [1996-2001] CBA Article XIII, Section 1A(4) stated that "The University shall establish a perpetual hospitalization and medical benefits fund in the sum of two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) x x x x" it follows that the amount of P2M every school year must be slided in regardless of the augmentation amount as may be appropriated. The word shall is mandatory and the word perpetual [is] continuous thus, [UST] is obligated to remit the actual amount to wit:

SY 1996-1997 - P2M = P2M SY 1997-1998 - P2M + P1M = P3M SY 1998-1999 - P2M + P1M = P3M SY 1999-2000 - P4M (Renegotiated) = P4M SY 2000-2001 - P4M = P4M TOTAL REMITTANCE = P16M

Thus, [UST] therefore has an unremitted fund of Eight Million (P8,000,000.00) pesos.

Corollarily, the CBA covering the period SY 2001-2006 [UST] is under obligation to remit two (2) million (P2,000,000.00) [sic] pesos every year or a total of ten million (P10,000,000.00) pesos in addition to whatever augmented amount stipulated in the CBA.

In fine, the total unremitted amount to the [hospitalization and medical benefits] fund is eighteen million (P18,000,000.00) pesos. P8M for SY 1996-2001 and P10M for SY 2001-2006.[9]

The LA did not find UST's non-compliance with the 1996-2001 CBA as acts that constitute unfair labor practice.

The failure of [UST] to slide in yearly the P2M hospitalization fund is not violation of the CBA but an error in the interpretation of the provision of the CBA. It could not be said either that [UST] acted with malice and bad faith in view of the compliance with the other economic provision[s] of the CBA. An error in the interpretation of a provision in the CBA, absent any malice or bad faith could not be considered as unfair labor practice as held in the case of Singapore Airlines Local Employees Association vs. NLRC, et al., 130 SCRA 472.[10]

The dispositive portion of the LA's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [UST] to remit the amount of eighteen million (P18,000,000.00) pesos to [the] hospitalization and medical benefits fund pursuant to the mandate of the Collective Bargaining Agreement on economic benefits.

[UST is] likewise directed to pay attorney's fee[s] equivalent to ten (10) percent of the total monetary award in this case.

Other claims dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[11]

USTFU filed a Memorandum of Partial Appeal[12] from the LA's Decision. USTFU claimed that the LA erred in holding that UST is liable to USTFU in the amount of P18 million only, and in not holding that the amounts claimed by USTFU should be remitted by UST to USTFU. USTFU claimed that, as of 2011, UST's total liability to the fund is P97 million: P17 million for CBA years 1996 to 2001, P40 million for CBA years 2001 to 2006, and P40 million for CBA years 2006 to 2011. USTFU also claimed that the amount should be remitted by UST to USTFU for proper turnover to the fund.

UST, on the other hand, filed an Appeal Memorandum.[13] UST claimed that the LA committed grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance over the case because the issue is within the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. UST further claimed that the LA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that UST erred in its interpretation of the CBA and in not finding that USTFU's claims are already barred by prescription.

The NLRC's Ruling

The NLRC granted USTFU's appeal and denied UST's appeal for lack of merit. The NLRC ordered UST to pay USTFU P80,000,000.00 and attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the monetary award.

The NLRC pointed out that UST's refusal to comply, despite repeated demands, with the CBA's economic provisions is tantamount to a gross and flagrant violation. Thus, the present case properly falls under the LA's original jurisdiction as well as the NLRC's appellate jurisdiction. The issue of prescription also cannot be held against USTFU because the cause of action accrued only when UST refused to comply with USTFU's 6 February 2007 demand letter. The demand letter was sent only after the conduct of proceedings in the Permanent Union-University Committee (PUUC).

The NLRC noted that the subsequent CBAs between UST and USTFU show that the parties intended that the amount appropriated each year to augment the fund shall be carried over to the succeeding years and is chargeable to the tuition fee increment. The NLRC ruled that the amounts appropriated for each year during the effectivity of the 1996-2001 CBA should still be appropriated to the succeeding years. From school year 1997-1998 and onwards, the basis for such carry over is that the amounts were sourced from tuition increases corresponding to a given school year. Since any increase in tuition is integrated into the subsequent tuition, the amount allocated to the fund because of the tuition increase should be remitted to the fund. The 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 CBAs have express provisions on the carry over. The NLRC computed UST's deficiency[14] as follows: For the 1996-2001 CBA:

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total amount 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 that should be submitted 2M 2M 2M 2M 2M 1M 1M 1M 1M 1M 1M 1M 4M 4M 2M + 3M + 4M + 8M + 8M = 25M

Since it is undisputed that [UST] remitted the amount of PhP8,000,000.00 only, there is still a deficiency of PhP17,000,000.00 corresponding to the 1996-2001 CBA.

x x x x

For the 2001-2006 CBA:

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Total amount 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2005-06 that should be submitted

2M 2M 2M 2M 3M 3M 3M 3M 3M 2M + 5M + 8M + 8M + 23M

For the 2006-2011 CBA:

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total amount 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 that should be submitted

8M+ 8M + 8M + 8M + 8M= 40M

The NLRC computed UST's total liability for school years 1996-1997 up to 2010-2011 at P80,000,000.00. The records show that UST remitted P8,000,000.00 for 1996-2001 CBA, and there is absence of proof that the additional contributions to the fund were made for the 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 CBAs. The NLRC also ordered UST to pay USTFU attorney's fees at 10% of the monetary award.

UST filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision. UST again claimed that the Voluntary Arbitrator, and not LA, had jurisdiction over the interpretation of the CBA; the P80,000,000.00 award had no basis; and the fund should be remitted to the Hospital and Medical Benefits Committee, not to USTFU, as stated in the CBA.

In a Resolution promulgated on 29 July 2011, the NLRC denied UST's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

UST filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. UST still questioned the jurisdiction of the LA, as well as the award of P80,000,000.00. UST also claimed that USTFU's money claims are barred by prescription, and that the proper recipient of the award should be the Hospital and Medical Benefits Committee. Finally, UST also questioned the award for attorney's fees.[15]

On 8 November 2011, USTFU filed a comment before the CA. USTFU claimed that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that USTFU is entitled to its claims for payment of the unremitted benefits. USTFU also claimed that certiorari is not a proper remedy for UST because the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.[16]

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

The CA, in its decision promulgated on 13 July 2012, disposed of the present case by agreeing with UST's argument that the LA and the NLRC did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the present case. The CA stated that since USTFU's ultimate objective is to clarify the relevant items in the CBA, then USTFU's complaint should have been filed with the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.

The dispositive portion of the CA's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent NLRC, the petition is GRANTED. Without prejudice to the re-filing of private respondent's complaint with the proper forum, the assailed NLRC decision dated June 8, 2011 and resolution dated July 29, 2011 in NLRC LAC No. 10-003370-08, as well as the decision dated September 24, 2010 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 09-09745-07 are hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[17]

USTFU filed its motion for reconsideration[18] before the CA. USTFU maintained that the LA and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.

In a resolution[19] promulgated on 19 October 2012, the CA denied USTFU's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

USTFU filed the present petition for review[20] before this Court on 7 December 2012.

The Issues

USTFU enumerated the following grounds warranting allowance of its petition: The Honorable Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings in holding that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over the complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) filed by USTFU.

The Court of Appeals acted in a way not in accord with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court in holding that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the instant case despite the fact that Article XIII ("Grievance Machinery") of the CBA is not applicable.

The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts in not finding that under Art. XXII of the CBA, the Permanent University-Union Committee (PUUC) is the proper forum to resolve the dispute between UST and USTFU. However, Art. XXII does not provide for a "voluntary arbitration" clause and therefore, USTFU validly filed the complaint for ULP before the Labor Arbiter.

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in its appreciation of evidence in not finding that the parties agreed to have the dispute resolved by the labor tribunals and UST had actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which is tantamount to a recognition of the jurisdiction of the said bodies.

The Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of proceedings in referring back the case to voluntary arbitration despite the fact that the parties already fully and exhaustively litigated the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which both correctly found in favor of USTFU. Moreover, referral to voluntary arbitration would result in waste of precious time in relitigating the case all over again.[21]

UST, for its part, enumerated the following grounds for opposing USTFU's petition:

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is the Voluntary Arbitrator which has jurisdiction over the instant case.

Assuming arguendo that NLRC has jurisdiction over the instant case, it clearly erred when it made an award not prayed for in petitioner USTFU's complaint, in effect mandating double payment.

Assuming arguendo that NLRC has jurisdiction over the instant case, it erred in ruling that respondent UST is still liable to pay the amount of ?17,000,000.00 for the period 1996-2001 under the 1996-2001 CBA considering that: a. There is no slide-in provision in the 1996-2001 CBA. b. The amounts allocated for the Hospitalization Fund during SYs 1996-2001 were not sourced from the 70% share of the teaching and non-teaching personnel in the tuition fee increases.

The complaint for money claims of petitioner USTFU arising from the interpretation of the 1996-2001 CBA is already barred by prescription.

Assuming arguendo that NLRC has jurisdiction over the instant case, it unjustly and erroneously ordered respondent UST to pay the subject amount to petitioner USTFU and not to the Hospital and Medical Benefits Committee under the CBA.[22]

The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit. We shall address the issues raised by the parties one by one.

Jurisdiction over the Present Case

On the issue of jurisdiction, we affirm with modification the ruling of the CA. The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the present case; however, despite the lack of jurisdiction, we rule on the issues presented. We recognize that a remand to the voluntary arbitration stage will give rise to the possibility that this case will still reach this Court through the parties' appeals. Furthermore, it does not serve the cause of justice if we allow this case to go unresolved for an inordinate amount of time.

We quote the pertinent Articles of the Labor Code of the Philippines below:

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, x x x:

1. Unfair labor practices cases; x x x x (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. (c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.

Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.

Art. 262-A. Procedures. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have the power to hold hearings, receive evidences and take whatever action is necessary to resolve the issue or issues subject to the dispute, including efforts to effect a voluntary settlement between the parties.

All parties to the dispute shall be entitled to attend the arbitration proceedings. The attendance of any third party to the exclusion of any witness from the proceedings shall be determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Hearing may be adjourned for cause or upon agreement by the parties.

Unless the parties agree otherwise, it shall be mandatory for the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators to render an award or decision within twenty (20) calendar days from the date of submission of the dispute to voluntary arbitration.

The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.

Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of the absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for any reason, may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or regular courts or any public official whom the parties may designate in the submission agreement to execute the final decision, order or award.

On the other hand, the pertinent provisions in the 1996-2001 CBA between UST and USTFU provide:

ARTICLE X GRIEVANCE MACHINERY

Section 1. Grievance. - Any misunderstanding concerning policies and practices directly affecting faculty members covered by this [collective bargaining] agreement or their working conditions in the UNIVERSITY or any dispute arising as to the meaning, application or violation of any provisions of this Agreement or any complaint that a covered faculty member may have against the UNIVERSITY shall be considered a grievance.

Section 2. Exclusion. - Termination of employment and preventive suspension shall be exempted from the provisions of this Article as the same shall be governed by the procedure in the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

Section 3. Procedure. - A grievance shall be settled as expeditiously as possible in accordance with the following procedure: STEP I. Upon presentation of a grievance in writing by the aggrieved faculty member, to the FACULTY UNION Grievance Officer, the said officer shall present the same to the Dean or school/department head concerned who shall render his decision on the matter within five (5) school days from the date of the presentation. If the aggrieved party is not satisfied with the decision, or if the Dean or school/department head fails to act within the five-school-day period, appeal may be made to Step II within five (5) school days from receipt of the decision or, in the absence of a decision, the expiration of the period for its rendition. If no appeal is made within the period of appeal, the grievance shall be deemed settled on the basis of Step I.

STEP II. All appeals from Step I shall be presented to and considered by an Adjudication Committee which shall be composed of two (2) representatives chosen by the UNIVERSITY and two (2) representatives chosen by the FACULTY UNION. The Committee shall meet within ten (10) school days after the elevation to this step and and try to settle the grievance to the satisfaction of all concerned. It shall render its decision within twenty (20) school days following the presentation of the grievance to the Adjudication Committee. A quorum for any meeting of the Committee shall consist of a majority of its entire membership. The affirmative vote of at least three (3) members of the Committee shall be necessary to reach a decision. If the Committee renders a decision, the grievance shall be deemed settled accordingly. If the Committee fails to make a decision within the period of twenty (20) days above stated, the FACULTY UNION President may, within ten (10) days thereafter elevate the grievance to Step III.

STEP III. The grievance appealed to this step shall be handled by the FACULTY UNION President who shall take it up with the Rector of the UNIVERSITY who, in turn, shall settle the grievance within ten (10) days. If no settlement is arrived at within the aforementioned period, the grievance will automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration.

STEP IV. The mechanics of arbitration shall be as follows: (a) The UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY UNION shall select within three (3) days, by raffle or process of elimination, an arbitrator mutually agreeable to them preferably from the list provided by the Bureau of Labor Relations.

(b) The voluntary arbitrator shall render an award within ten (10) days after the issue in dispute is submitted for decision and his award shall be final and binding upon all parties to the grievance.

(c) Arbitration costs shall be shared equally by the UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY UNION.[23]

ARTICLE XXII PERMANENT UNIVERSITY-UNION COMMITTEE (PUUC)

Permanent UNION-UNIVERSITY Committee (PUUC). - The UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY UNION realize that notwithstanding this CBA, there will remain problems and irritants which will require the continuing attention of both parties. Symbolic of the mutual good faith of the parties, they have agreed to establish a permanent committee, where the UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY UNION are equally represented, to address these problems as they arise.

a. Within thirty (30) days from signing of this Agreement, the Committee shall meet. The members of the Committee are the following:

1) For the ADMINISTRATION: a) Rector or his representative; b) Vice Rector for Academic Affairs or his representative; c) Vice Rector for Finance or his representative; and d) Appointee of the Rector. 2) For the FACULTY UNION: a) President of the UNION; b) Executive Vice President of the UNION or his representative; c) Secretary General or his representative; and d) Appointee of the UNION President. b. The regular meetings of this Committee shall be held at least bi-monthly or as the need arises.

c. The decision reached in the PUUC Meetings shall be binding to all UNIVERSITY functionaries.[24]

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In the present case, USTFU alleged that UST committed unfair labor practice in its blatant violation of the economic provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA, and subsequently, the 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 CBAs. UST, meanwhile, has consistently questioned USTFU's act of bringing the case before the LA, and of not submitting the present case to voluntary arbitration. The LA assumed jurisdiction, but ruled that UST did not commit any unfair labor practice in UST's interpretation of the economic provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA. The NLRC, on the other hand, ruled that there was indeed unfair labor practice. The CA ruled that the LA and the NLRC did not have jurisdiction as there was no unfair labor practice.


Reading the pertinent portions of the 1996-2001 CBA along with those of the Labor Code, we see that UST and USTFU's misunderstanding arose solely from their differing interpretations of the CBA's provisions on economic benefits, specifically those concerning the fund. Therefore, it was clearly error for the LA to assume jurisdiction over the present case. The case should have been resolved through the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.

Article 217(c) of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiter shall refer to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as provided in the CBA those cases that involve the interpretation of said agreements. Article 261 of the Labor Code further provides that all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA, including violations of said agreement, are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Excluded from this original and exclusive jurisdiction is gross violation of the CBA, which is defined in Article 261 as "flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions" of the CBA. San Jose v. NLRC[25] provides guidelines for understanding Articles 217, 261, and 262:

1. The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in Articles 217, 261, and 262 can possibly include money claims in one form or another.

2. The cases where the Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction are enumerated in Article 217, and that of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators in Article 261.

3. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters is qualified by an exception as indicated in the introductory sentence of Article 217 (a), to wit:

"Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters ... (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiter shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide ... the following cases involving all workers..."

The phrase "Except as otherwise provided under this Code" refers to the following exceptions:

A. Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters ...

x x x

(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company procedure/policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator as may be provided in said agreement.

B. Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.

Parenthetically, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 (c), for money claims is limited only to those arising from statutes or contracts other than a Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims "arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and, those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," under Article 261.

4. The jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is provided for in Arts. 261 and 262 of the Labor Code as indicated above.

1. A close reading of Article 261 indicates that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is limited only to:

"... unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies... Accordingly, violations of a collective bargaining agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. x x x."

2. Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, however, can exercise jurisdiction over any and all disputes between an employer and a union and/or individual worker as provided for in Article 262.

"Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks."


It must be emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators under Article 262 must be voluntarily conferred upon by both labor and management. The labor disputes referred to in the same Article 262 can include all those disputes mentioned in Article 217 over which the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction.

As shown in the above contextual and wholistic analysis of Articles 217, 261, and 262 of the Labor Code, the National Labor Relations Commission correctly ruled that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioner's money-claim underpayment of retirement benefits, as the controversy between the parties involved an issue "arising from the interpretation or implementation" of a provision of the collective bargaining agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy under Article 261 of the Labor Code, and not the Labor Arbiter.

Despite the allegation that UST refused to comply with the economic provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA, we cannot characterize UST's refusal as "flagrant and/or malicious." Indeed, UST's literal interpretation of the CBA was, in fact, what led USTFU to file its complaint. To our mind, USTFU actually went beyond the text of the 1996-2001 CBA when it claimed that the integrated tuition fee increase as described in Section 1D(2) is the basis for UST's alleged deficiency.

We cannot subscribe to USTFU's view that the 1996-2001 CBA's Article X: Grievance Machinery is not applicable to the present case. When the issue is about the grievance procedure, USTFU insists on a literal interpretation of the 1996-2001 CBA. Indeed, the present case falls under Section 1's definition of grievance: "[a]ny misunderstanding concerning policies and practices directly affecting faculty members covered by this [collective bargaining] agreement or their working conditions in the UNIVERSITY or any dispute arising as to the meaning, application or violation of any provisions of this Agreement or any complaint that a covered faculty member may have against the UNIVERSITY." Section 2 excludes only termination and preventive suspension from the grievance procedure.

USTFU's focus is on the 1996-2001 CBA's provisions about the grievance process rather than the provision about the subject matters covered by the grievance process. Despite UST's alleged violation of the economic provisions of the CBA by its insufficient remittances to the fund, a dispute arising as to the meaning, application or violation of the CBA, USTFU used Step I in Section 3, and ignored Steps III and IV, to rule out any referral to voluntary arbitration. USTFU concludes that the 1996-2001 CBA's provisions on grievance machinery only refer to a grievance of a faculty member against UST, and that said provisions do not contemplate a situation where USTFU itself has a grievance against UST.

USTFU argues that the PUUC is the proper forum to resolve the issue, and that the filing of a complaint before the LA is proper in the absence of a voluntary arbitration clause in the 1996-2001 CBA's Article XXII: Permanent University-Union Committee. However, as provided in the 1996-2001 CBA, PUUC is established for "continuing problems and irritants which will require the continuing attention" of UST and USTFU. Clearly, the PUUC addresses matters not covered by the CBA.

USTFU's adamant refusal to consider voluntary arbitration ignores Articles 261 to 262-A of the Labor Code, as well as Steps III and IV of Section 3 of the 1996-2001 CBA.

Accrual of Cause of Action and Prescription of Claims

USTFU's claims arose from UST's alleged failure to contribute the correct amounts to the fund during the 1996-2001 CBA. However, USTFU did not complain of any violation by UST during the lifetime of the 1996-2001 CBA. Neither did USTFU complain of any violation by UST during the lifetime of the succeeding 2001-2006 CBA. It was only on 6 February 2007 that USTFU sent a demand letter to UST Rector Fr. Ernesto M. Arceo, O.P., for the claimed hospitalization and medical benefits under the 1996-2001 CBA. On 2 March 2007, UST, through its Rector, Fr. Ernesto M. Arceo, O.P., informed USTFU, through its President, Dr. Gil Gamilla, that "the hospitalization and medical benefits contained in [the 1996-2001 CBA] were a one-time give, and therefore not meant to slide." USTFU notified UST on 24 June 2007 about its intent to file the necessary complaint. On 6 September 2007, USTFU filed a complaint against UST before the LA.

The 1996-2001 CBA, as well as the applicable laws, is silent as to when UST's alleged violation becomes actionable. Thus, we apply Article 1150 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: "The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought."[26] Prescription of an action is counted from the time the action may be brought.[27]

It is error to state that USTFU's cause of action accrued only upon UST's categorical denial of its claims on 2 March 2007. USTFU's cause of action accrued when UST allegedly failed to comply with the economic provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA. Upon such failure by UST, USTFU could have brought an action against UST.

Article 290 of the Labor Code provides that unfair labor practices prescribe within one year "from accrual of such unfair labor practice; otherwise, they shall be forever barred." Article 291 of the same Code provides that money claims arising from employer-employee relations prescribe "within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred." USTFU's claims under the 1996-2001 CBA, whether characterized as one for unfair labor practice or for money claims from employer-employee relations, have already prescribed when USTFU filed a complaint before the LA.

USTFU filed its complaint under the theory of unfair labor practice. Thus, USTFU had one year from UST's alleged failure to contribute, or "slide in," the correct amount to the fund to file its complaint. USTFU had one year for every alleged breach by UST: school year (SY) 1997-1998, SY 1998-1999, SY 1999-2000, SY 2000-2001, SY 2001-2002, and SY 2002-2003. USTFU did not file any complaint within the respective one-year prescriptive periods. USTFU decided to file its complaint only in 2007, several years after the accrual of its several possible causes of action. Even if USTFU filed its complaint under the theory of money claims from employer-employee relations, its cause of action still has prescribed.

Determination of the Benefits Due

We consolidate USTFU's claims, UST's remittances, and UST's alleged balances in the table below:

USTFU's claims[28] UST's remittances[29] UST's alleged balances

1996 to 2001 CBA

SY 1996-1997 P2,000,000.00 P2,000,000.00 0 SY 1997-1998 P3,000,000.00 P1,000,000.00 P2,000,000.00 SY 1998-1999 P4,000,000.00 P1,000,000.00 P3,000,000.00

1999 Memorandum of Agreement

SY 1999-2000 P8,000,000.00 P4,000,000.00 P4,000,000.00 SY 2000-2001 P8,000,000.00 - P8,000,000.00 2001 to 2006 CBA SY 2001-2002 P8,000,000.00 P2,000,000.00 P6,000,000.00 SY 2002-2003 P8,000,000.00 P5,000,000.00 P3,000,000.00 SY 2003-2004 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0 SY 2004-2005 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0 SY 2005-2006 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0 2006-2011 CBA SY 2006-2007 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0 SY 2007-2008 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0 SY 2008-2009 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0 SY 2009-2010 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0 SY 2010-2011 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0 Total P105,000,000.00 P79,000,000.00 P26,000,000.00

We restate the following provisions in the pertinent CBAs to establish what USTFU claims as its bases for additional funds:

1996-2001 CBA

ARTICLE XIII ECONOMIC BENEFITS

Section 1. ECONOMIC BENEFIT- Upon ratification and approval and for the term of this Agreement. the economic benefits to be granted by the UNIVERSITY and the schedule of such releases are as follows:

A. School Year 1996-97 (June 1, 1996 to May 31, 1997):

x x x x 4. Hospitalization Fund: Upon ratification and approval hereof, the UNIVERSITY shall establish a perpetual hospitalization and medical benefits fund in the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000) to be managed conjointly by a hospitalization and medical benefits committee where both management and union are equally represented. The joint committee shall promulgate its internal rules and regulations, and on the second year of this agreement, i.e., SY 1997-98, may allocate such amount as required, but not to exceed ten per cent (10%) of the gross income of the fund, for administrative expenses. For the duration of the first year of operation of the fund, the UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY UNION shall equally subsidize the operations of the fund.

The hospitalization costs and medical benefits of the members of the faculty as provided in Article XVI of this agreement shall be taken from this fund.

This fund is independently managed by the aforementioned joint committee, subject to independent audit. The yearly state of finances of the fund shall be reported, appended to the FACULTY UNION's own annual report, to all members of the university faculty.

B. School Year 1997-98 (June 1, 1997-May 31, 1998):

x x x x 2. Hospitalization Fund: The UNIVERSITY shall contribute the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000) to augment the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits fund. The said sum shall be added to the remaining balance of the aforementioned fund; x x x x

C. School Year 1998-99 (June 1, 1998-May 31, 1999):

x x x x 2. Hospitalization Fund: The UNIVERSITY shall contribute the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000) to augment the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits fund. The said sum shall be added to the remaining balance of the aforementioned fund; D. Miscellaneous Provisions: 1. At the end of this agreement, and within three months therefrom, the UNIVERSITY shall render an accounting of the monies it paid or released to the covered faculty in consequence thereof;

2. All the economic benefits herein given and those elsewhere provided under this agreement, other than retirement benefits and one-half of the signing bonus, are chargeable to the tuition fee share, if any, of the faculty members;

3. In the event that the tuition fee benefits of the faculty for any of the three years covered by this part of this agreement i.e., the University decides to raise tuition fees in the coming two school years, exceed those provided herein, the same may be allocated for salaries and other benefits as determined by the FACULTY UNION and the matter duly communicated to the UNIVERSITY; and,

4. None of the benefits provided herein, both distributable immediately after ratification and those to be given during the term hereof, other than the amounts checked-off and the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits are to be directly distributed to the faculty members by the University.[30] 1999 Memorandum of Agreement

1.0 The University hereby agrees to grant increase in salary and fringe benefits as provided for by the tuition fee increase of school year 1999-2000 according to the following scheme:

x x x x

6.0 If there is any tuition fee increase for school year 2000-2001, there will be an additional increase in salary/fringe benefits to be agreed upon by both parties.

7.0 An additional amount of four million pesos will be deposited in the hospitalization fund of the faculty.[31]

2001-2006 CBA

Article XX HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL BENEFITS

Section 1. Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund. - The UNION and the UNIVERSITY shall build up and maintain the perpetual Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund. For this purpose, the UNIVERSITY agrees to appropriate for AY 2001-2002 two million pesos (PhP2,000,000.00); for AY 2002-2003 three million pesos (PhP3,000,000.00); and for AY 2003-2004 another three million pesos (PhP3,000,000.00). It is understood that the amount appropriated for each year is carried over to the succeeding years and is chargeable to the tuition fee increment. x x x[32]

2006-2011 CBA

Article XX HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL BENEFITS

Section 5. Miscellaneous Provisions. a. The UNIVERSITY will continue to slide in the amounts set aside in the 2001-2006 CBA to augment the fund. Fifty percent of the amount due shall be remitted within a month from the start of the first semester and the other fifty percent within a month from the start of the second semester of the academic year. These sums of money shall be remitted without necessity of demand on the part of the union and may not be garnished or held by the university on account of disputes in hospital billings between the University and the Union.

x x x x[33]

USTFU claims that UST's contributions should have been cumulative, with the amount appropriated for each year carried over to the succeeding years and is chargeable to the tuition fee increment. However, USTFU's claims are not supported by the economic provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA and the 1999 Memorandum of Agreement reproduced above.

We wholly agree with UST's interpretation of the economic provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA, the 1999 Memorandum of Agreement, and the 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 CBAs, as well as its remittances to the fund for the covered periods. UST faithfully followed the clear provisions of these agreements.

The 1996-2001 CBA established the fund, with an initial remittance of P2,000,000.00 for school year 1996-1997. UST bound itself to augment the fund by contributing P1,000,000.00 per year for school years 1997-1998 and 1998-1999. The 1999 Memorandum of Agreement merely stated that UST will deposit P4,000,000.00 to the fund. Express mention of the carry-over is found only in Section 1, Article XX of the 2001-2006 CBA: "It is understood that the amount appropriated for each year is carried over to the succeeding years x x x." The 1996-2001 CBA does not have this carry-over provision. During the lifetime of the 1996-2001 CBA, the 1999 Memorandum of Agreement, and the 2001-2006 CBA, USTFU never questioned the non-compliance by UST with an alleged carry-over agreement applicable to the 1996-2001 CBA.

This Court is well aware of Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[i]n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer." This Court is also well aware that when the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, the literal meaning of the stipulations shall govern.[34] In the present case, the CBA provisions pertaining to the fund are clear and should be interpreted according to their literal meaning.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DECLARE that the claims of the University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union have prescribed and that there is no carry-over provision for the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund in the 1996-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement and in the 1999 Memorandum of Agreement. The carry-over provision for the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund is found only in the 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 Collective Bargaining Agreements.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro,* Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 28 July 2014.

[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

[2] Rollo, pp. 75-95-A. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, concurring.

[3] Id. at 97. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, concurring.

[4] Id. at 430-446. Penned by Commissioner Angelo Ang Palaña, with Commissioner Numeriano D. Villena, concurring. Presiding Commissioner Herminio V. Suelo took no part.

[5] Id. at 475-476. Penned by Commissioner Angelo Ang Palaña, with Presiding Commissioner Herminio V. Suelo and Commissioner Numeriano D. Villena, concurring.

[6] Id. at 313-324. Penned by LA Catalino R. Laderas.

[7] Id. at 10-16.

[8] Id. at 313.

[9] Id. at 322-323.

[10] Id. at 323.

[11] Id. at 324.

[12] Id. at 325-345.

[13] Id. at 346-368.

[14] Id. at 443-445. The NLRC decision did not provide for Year 2004-2005.

[15] Id. at 492-493.

[16] Id. at 559-560.

[17] Id. at 95-A.

[18] Id. at 603-624.

[19] Id. at 97.

[20] Id. at 33-72.

[21] Id. at 48-49.

[22] Id. at 648-649.

[23] Id. at 162-164.

The corresponding Article in the 2006-2011 CBA reads:

Article XIII GRIEVANCE MACHINERY

Section 1. Guiding Principles in Dispute Settlement. - The intention and purpose of the parties is to establish a means for the prompt disposition and amicable settlement of all grievances. The parties shall endeavor to resolve all disputes through friendly negotiations as their mutual commitment to ensure the continuity of work; that an open conflict, in any form, involves losses to the parties, and therefore, every effort shall be exerted in this direction to avoid such conflict.

Section 2. Grievance. - Any misunderstanding concerning policies and practices directly affecting faculty members covered by this Agreement or their working conditions in the UNIVERSITY, or any dispute arising as to the meaning, application or violation of any provisions of this Agreement or any complaint that a covered faculty member may have against the UNIVERSITY shall be considered a grievance.

Section 3. Exclusion. - Termination of employment and preventive suspension shall be exempted from the provisions of this Article as the same shall be governed by the procedure provided in the Labor Code and its implementing Rules.

Section 4. Procedure. A grievance shall be settled as expeditiously as possible in accordance with the following procedure:

STEP I. Upon presentation of a grievance in writing by the aggrieved faculty member, to the FACULTY UNION Grievance Officer, the said officer shall present the same to the Dean or School/Department Head concerned who shall render his decision on the matter within five (5) school days from the date of the presentation. If the aggrieved party is not satisfied with the decision, or if the Dean or school/department head fails to act within the five-school-day period, appeal may be made to Step II within ten (10) school days from receipt of the decision or, in the absence of a decision, the expiration of the period for its rendition. If no appeal is made within the period of appeal, the grievance shall be deemed settled on the basis of Step I.

STEP II. All appeals from Step I shall be presented to and considered by an Adjudication Committee which shall be composed of two (2) representatives chosen by the UNIVERSITY and two (2) representatives chosen by the FACULTY UNION. The Committee shall meet within ten (10) school days after the elevation of appeals to this step and and try to settle the grievance to the satisfaction of all concerned. It shall render its decision within twenty (20) school days following the presentation of the grievance to the Adjudication Committee. A quorum for any meeting of the Committee shall consist of a majority of its entire membership. The affirmative vote of at least three (3) members of the Committee shall be necessary to reach a decision. If the Committee renders a decision, the grievance shall be deemed settled accordingly. If the Committee fails to make a decision within the period of twenty (20) days above stated, the FACULTY UNION President may, within ten (10) days thereafter elevate the grievance to Step III.


STEP III. The grievance appealed to this step shall be handled by the FACULTY UNION President who shall take it up with the Rector of the UNIVERSITY who, in turn, shall settle the grievance within ten (10) days. If no settlement is arrived at within the aforementioned period, the grievance will automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration.

STEP IV. The mechanics of arbitration shall be as follows:

(a) The UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY UNION shall select within three (3) days, by raffle or process of elimination, an arbitrator mutually agreeable to them preferably from the list provided by the Bureau of Labor Relations.

(b) The voluntary arbitrator shall render an award within ten (10) days after the issue in dispute is submitted for decision and his/her award shall be final and binding upon all parties to the grievance.

(c) Arbitration costs shall be shared equally by the UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY UNION.

Section 5. Money Claims. - In case a faculty member or UNION wins a money claim under the Grievance Machinery, voluntary arbitration, or negotiation against the UNIVERSITY, the monetary claim shall be awarded not later than forty-five (45) days from the date of the receipt of the final decision including interest due thereon for the duration with which the money was with the University from the time that it should have been due the Union or faculty. If the money claim is won in a judicial or quasi-judicial body, the UNIVERSITY shall shoulder all the money claims in accordance with the decision.

A faculty member exonerated from an administrative case or judicial case shall be entitled to reimbursement of CBA benefits and educational benefits even if the judicial award is for salary backpay only. Internal administrative decisions are deemed to include reimbursements of all CBA and educational benefits, if applicable, even if the decision does not mention it. (Emphasis in the original) Id. at 415-416.

[24] Id. at 752. The same provisions are found in Article XXII in the 2006-2011 CBA.

[25] See San Jose v. NLRC, 355 Phil. 759, 771-773 (1998).

[26] See Tolentino v. Inciong, 109 Phil. 1116 (1960).

[27] Calma and Ontanillas v. Montuya, 120 Phil. 896, 900 (1964).

[28] Rollo, pp. 43-44, 192-193.

[29] Id. at 350, 361, 522, 532, 635, 637.

[30] Id. at 168-170. Boldfacing added.

[31] Id. at 253-254. Boldfacing added.

[32] Id. at 278. Boldfacing added.

[33] Id. at 425. Boldfacing added.

[34] See Wesleyan University-Philippines v. Wesleyan University-Philippines Faculty and Staff Association, G.R. No. 181806, 12 March 2014.