Hypertension And Glaucoma, Not Being Work-Connected

[2014V1032] GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS. AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO, RESPONDENT

G.R. No. 196102
2014 Nov 26
2nd Division

Labor > Social Welfare Legislation > GSIS Law RA 8291

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] are 1) the October 30, 2009 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 which set aside the June 24, 2004 Decision[3] of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-16174-0209-04 and ordered the payment of disability benefits to the herein respondent Aurelia Y. Calumpiano; and 2) the CA's February 23, 2011 Resolution4 denying reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision.

Factual Antecedents

As determined by the CA, the facts are as follows: x x x Aurelia Y. Calumpiano[5] was employed as Court Stenographer at the then Court of First Instance of Samar from January 5, 1972 until her retirement on March 30, 2002.

On March 7, 2002, shortly before her retirement, [respondent] filed before the Supreme Court, an application for disability retirement on account of her ailmentfs], Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease [and] Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma. To bolster her claim, [respondent] submitted the medical certificates issued by her attending physicians, Dr. Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer Montes, both of whom are Ophthalmologists [at] Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital. She submitted them together with the results of her perimetry test, [a certificate of] which x x x was issued by Dr. Lim. On September 30, 2002, the Supreme Court approved [respondent's] application for disability retirement, under Republic Act No. 8291 (New GSIS Act of 1997).

[Respondent's] disability claim was forwarded to GSIS,[6] but the latter denied her claim for the reason that hypertension and glaucoma, which were her illnesses, were not work[-]related. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the GSIS.

Petitioner filed an appeal [with] the ECC, which rendered the assailed Decision,[7] the dispositive portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant appeal dismissed for want of merit.

SO ORDERED.[8]

In dismissing respondent's appeal, the ECC held:

"Glaucoma is characterized by an intraocular pressure sufficiently elevated to produce intraocular damage. The three major categories of glaucoma are: (1) angle-closure glaucoma, (2) open-angle glaucoma, and (3) congenital and juvenile glaucoma. Eyes that develop primary angle glaucoma are anatomically predisposed to the condition. In primary open-angle glaucoma, [the] angle appears open [and] does not seem to function properly. The exact nature of obstruction has not yet been elucidated. Congenital glaucoma and juvenile glaucoma are thought to be hereditary in most cases, although infectious causes are possible (rubella).["] (Pathologic Basis of Disease by Corran, 6th edition, pages 1374-1375)

"Hypertension is an increase in the blood pressure within the normal of less than 120/80 mm Hg as defined by the Joint National Committee VII. Primary risk factor for developing hypertension is smoking. Other important risk factors are excess body weight, high salt intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical inactivity and psychological factors, including stress." (Principles of Internal Medicine)

To warrant compensability of ailment and its resulting sickness, disability or death under P.D. 626, as amended, Rule III, Section l(b) thereof, specifically provides that the ailment must be listed by the Commission as an occupational disease with the conditions set forth therein satisfied, otherwise, the conditions imposed under the Increased Risk Theory must be complied with.

Appellant[9] worked as a Court Stenographer III of the Supreme Court for thirty (30) years. Her duties were no doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension. However, to make the same compensable, it is necessary that there must be impairment of function of her body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain resulting in her permanent disability. An examination of the appellant's records would show that she was not suffering from end[-]organ damage. This was shown in the x x x report [of the ECG] that was taken on the appellant on January 21, 2002. Thus, the same cannot be considered compensable and work-connected.

Likewise, her other ailment, Glaucoma[,] cannot also be considered work-connected. Medical science has explained that it is characterized by an intraocular pressure sufficiently elevated to produce intraocular glaucoma. Here, there was nothing in her duties that would cause or increase her risk of contracting the said ailment.[10]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Review[11] filed with the CA and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 85908, respondent sought to set aside the above ECC Decision, arguing that her illness is work-connected which thus entitles her to disability compensation.

On October 30, 2009, the CA issued the herein assailed Decision containing the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the Employees' Compensation Commission for the payment of the disability benefits due the Petitioner.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The CA held that while respondent's hypertension and glaucoma are not listed as occupational diseases under the implementing rules of the Employee Compensation Program under Presidential Decree No. 626[13] (PD 626), they were nonetheless contracted and became aggravated during her employment as court stenographer; that under the "increased risk theory," a "non-occupational disease" is compensable as long as proof of a causal connection between the work and the ailment is established;[14] that respondent's illnesses are connected to her work, given the nature of and pressure involved in her functions and duties as a court stenographer; that the certifications issued by the attending physicians certifying to respondent's illnesses should be given credence; that the ECC itself conceded that respondent's duties were "no doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension;" and that while the presumption of compensability has been abrogated with the issuance of PD 626, employees' compensation laws nevertheless constitute social legislation which allows for liberality in interpretation to the benefit of the employee, and the policy has always been to extend the applicability of said laws to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.[15]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same in its February 23, 2011 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT'S DISEASES (HYPERTENSION AND GLAUCOMA) ARE COMPENSABLE UNDER THE INCREASED RISK THEORY; AND

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING TFIE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE ECC.[16]

Petitioner's Arguments

Praying that the assailed CA pronouncements be set aside and that the June 24, 2004 Decision of the ECC be reinstated, petitioner argues in its Petition and Reply[17] that respondent's hypertension and glaucoma are not compensable under the principle of increased risk; that although essential hypertension is listed as an occupational disease, it is not compensable per se as the conditions under Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation[18] should be satisfied; that hypertension is compensable only "if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability;"[19] that since respondent did not suffer "end-organ damage" to or impairment of her kidneys, heart, eyes and brain which resulted in permanent disability, her illness is not compensable; that respondent's other illness -glaucoma - is not compensable;[20] and that the findings of the ECC should be accorded respect and finality, as it has the expertise and knowledge on account of its specialized jurisdiction over employee compensation cases.

Respondent's Arguments

In her Comment,[21] respondent seeks the denial of the Petition, arguing relevantly that the "increased risk theory," which applies to her, has been upheld in several decided cases;[22] that in disability compensation cases, it is not the injury which is compensated for but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of the employee's earning capacity;"[23] and that while the ECC has the expertise and knowledge relative to compensation cases, the CA is not precluded from making its own assessment of the case which goes against that of the ECC's.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

In resolving this case, the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Baul[24] comes into mind and lays the groundwork for a similar ruling. In said case, the Court held:

Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex "A" of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondent's disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are listed occupational diseases, their compensability requires compliance with all the conditions set forth in the Rules. In short, both are qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular accident, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability, provided that, the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-T scan.

The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of the above-mentioned conditions under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. As correctly pointed out by the CA, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. For, in interpreting and carrying out the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations, the primordial and paramount consideration is the employee's welfare. To safeguard the worker's rights, any doubt as to the proper interpretation and application must be resolved in [his] favor.

In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions of respondent's attending physicians sufficiently support her claim for disability benefits. Neither the GSIS nor the ECC convincingly deny their genuineness and due execution. The reports are made part of the record and there is no showing that they are false or erroneous, or resorted to [for the purpose] of deceiving the Court, hence, are entitled to due probative weight. The failure of respondent to submit to a full medical examination, as required by the rules, to substantiate her essential hypertension, is of no moment. The law is that laboratory reports such as X-ray and ECG are not indispensable prerequisites to compensability, the reason being that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims for compensation. Medical findings of the attending physician may be received in evidence and used as proof[s] of the fact in dispute. The doctor's certification as to the nature of claimant's disability may be given credence as he or she normally would not make untruthful certification. Indeed, no physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far[-]reaching and serious effect that his or her statements would cause on a money claim against a government agency would vouch indiscriminately without regarding his own interests and protection.

Significantly, even medical authorities have established that the exact etiology of essential hypertension cannot be accurately traced: The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate those cases of hypertension for which a specific endocrine or renal basis cannot be found, and in which the neural element may be only a mediator of other influences. Since even this latter relationship is not entirely clear, it is more properly listed for the moment in the category of unknown etiology. The term essential hypertension defines simply by failing to define; hence, it is of limited use except as an expression of our inability to understand adequately the forces at work.[25] It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments tracing the etiology of essential hypertension show that there is a relationship between the sickness and the nature and conditions of work, hi this jurisdiction, we have already ruled in a number of cases the strenuous office of a public schoolteacher. The case of Makabali v. Employees' Compensation Commission, which we have re-affirmed in the subsequent cases of De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, Antiporda v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, and De la Torre v. Employees' Compensation Commission, amply summarized, thus:

x x x x

The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent worsened and resulted in a CVA at the time she was already out of service is inconsequential. The main consideration for its compensability is that her illness was contracted during and by reason of her employment, and any non-work related factor that contributed to its aggravation is immaterial.

Indeed, an employee's disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause. The right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or misconduct. Simply stated, all medical consequences that flow from the primary injury are compensable.

P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Nonetheless, we ruled in Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, that:

Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old law, the present law has not ceased to be an employees'1 compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants; or that all doubts to the right to compensation must be resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the applicability of the law on employees' compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.[26] (Emphasis supplied)

Also, in Government Service Insurance System v. De Castro,[27] this Court made the following pronouncement:

Other than the given facts, another undisputed aspect of the case is the status of the ailments that precipitated De Castro's separation from the military service - CAD and hypertensive cardiovascular disease. These are occupational diseases. No less than the ECC itself confirmed the status of these ailments when it declared that "Contrary to the ruling of the System CAD is a form of cardiovascular disease which is included in the list of Occupational Diseases." Essential hypertension is also listed under Item 29 in Annex "A" of the Amended ECC Rules as an occupational disease.

Despite the compensable character of his ailments, both the GSIS and the ECC found De Castro's CAD to be non-work related and, therefore, non-compensable. To use the wording of the ECC decision, it denied De Castro's claim "due to the presence of factors which are not work-related, such as smoking and alcohol consumption." De Castro's own military records triggered this conclusion as his Admitting Notes, made when he entered the V. Luna General Hospital due to chest pains and hypertension, were that he was a smoker and a drinker.

As the CA did, we cannot accept the validity of this conclusion at face value because it considers only one side - the purely medical side - of De Castro's case and even then may not be completely correct. The ECC itself, in its decision, recites that CAD is caused, among others, by atherosclerosis of the coronary arteries that in turn, and lists the following major causes: increasing age; male gender; cigarette smoking; lipid disorder due to accumulation of too much fats in the body: hypertension or high blood pressure; insulin resistance due to diabetes; family history of CAD. The minor factors are: obesity; physical inactivity; stress; menopausal estrogen deficiency; high carbohydrate intake; and alcohol.

We find it strange that both the ECC and the GS1S singled out the presence of smoking and drinking as the factors that rendered De Castro's ailments, otherwise listed as occupational, to be non-compensable. To be sure, the causes of CAD and hypertension that the ECC listed and explained in its decision cannot be denied; smoking and drinking are undeniably among these causes. Flowever, they are not the sole causes of CAD and hypertension and, at least, not under the circumstances of the present case. For this reason, we fear for the implication of the ECC ailing if it will prevail and be read as definitive on the effects of smoking and drinking on compensability issues, even on diseases that are listed as occupational in character. The ruling raises the possible reading that smoking and drinking, by themselves, are factors that can bar compensability.

We ask the question of whether these factors can be sole determinants of compensability as the ECC has apparently failed to consider other factors such as age and gender from among those that the ECC itself listed as major and minor causes of atherosclerosis and, ultimately, of CAD. While age and gender are characteristics inherent in the person (and thereby may be considered non-work related factors), they also do affect a worker's job performance and may in this sense, together with stresses of the job, significantly contribute to illnesses such as CAD and hypertension. To cite an example, some workplace activities are appropriate only for the young (such as the lifting of heavy objects although these may simply be office files), and when repeatedly undertaken by older workers, may lead to ailments and disability. Thus, age coupled with an age-affected work activity may lead to compensability. From this perspective, none of the ECC's listed factors should be disregarded to the exclusion of others in determining compensability.

In any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important as raw medical findings and a claimant's personal and social history. This is a basic legal reality in workers' compensation law. We are therefore surprised that the ECC and the GSIS simply brushed aside the disability certification that the military issued with respect to De Castro's disability, based mainly on their primacy as the agencies with expertise on workers' compensation and disability issues.[28] (Emphasis supplied)

This case should not have been difficult for the petitioner to resolve on its own, given that so many cases have been decided in the past which should have provided it the guiding hand to decide disability cases on its own rightly - instead of putting claimants in the unfortunate position of having to chase the benefits they are clearly entitled to, and waste years prosecuting their claims in spite of their adverse circumstances in life. This Court should not have to parrot over and over again what clearly has been the settled rule; in many ways, this is a waste of time, and it only indicates that petitioner has either not learned its lesson, or it refuses to realize it.

Applying Baul and De Castro to the instant case and looking at the factual milieu, the Court agrees with the CA's conclusion and so declares that respondent's illness is compensable.

Respondent served the government for 30 long years; veritably, as the ECC itself said, "[h]er duties were no doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension"[29] - which is a listed occupational disease, contrary to the CA's pronouncement that it is not. And because it is a listed occupational disease, the "increased risk theory" does not apply - again, contrary to the CA's declaration; no proof of causation is required.

It can also be said that given respondent's age at the time, and taking into account the nature, working conditions, and pressures of her work as court stenographer ? which requires her to faithfully record each and every day virtually all of the court's proceedings; transcribe these notes immediately in order to malee them available to the court or the parties who require them; take down dictations by the judge, and transcribe them; and type in final form the judge's decisions, which activities extend beyond office hours and without additional compensation or overtime pay[30] - all these contributed to the development of her hypertension -or hypertensive cardiovascular disease, as petitioner would call it.[31] Consequently, her age, work, and hypertension caused the impairment of vision in both eyes due to "advanced to late stage glaucoma", which rendered her "legally blind."[32]

Contrary to petitioner's submissions, there appears to be a link between blood pressure and the development of glaucoma, which leads the Court to conclude that respondent's glaucoma developed as a result of her hypertension.

Although intraocular pressure (IOP) remains an important risk factor for glaucoma, it is clear that other factors can also influence disease development and progression. More recently, the role that blood pressure (BP) has in the genesis of glaucoma has attracted attention, as it represents a clinically modifiable risk factor and thus provides the potential for new treatment strategies beyond IOP reduction. The interplay between blood pressure and IOP determines the ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), which regulates blood flow to the optic nerve. If OPP is a more important determinant of ganglion cell injury than IOP, then hypotension should exacerbate the detrimental effects of IOP elevation, whereas hypertension should provide protection against IOP elevation. Epidemiological evidence provides some conflicting outcomes of the role of systemic hypertension in the development and progression of glaucoma. The most recent study showed that patients at both extremes of the blood pressure spectrum show an increased prevalence of glaucoma. Those with low blood pressure would have low OPP and thus reduced blood flow; however, that people with hypertension also show increased risk is more difficult to reconcile. This finding may reflect an inherent blood flow dysregulation secondary to chronic hypertension that would render retinal blood flow less able to resist changes in ocular perfusion pressure.[33] x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In recent years, we've learned a lot about ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), i.e., the pressure difference between blood entering the eye and IOP. It's clear that three forces ? OPP, IOP and blood pressure ? are interconnected in the glaucoma disease process. The mechanics of that relationship, however, remain ambiguous.

x x x x

The ties between hypertension and glaucoma are less well established but the data, in addition to my involvement in a new study (discussed below), have convinced me they probably do exist. Therefore, I believe potential hypertension, along with potential low blood pressure, should be investigated in patients whose glaucoma continues to progress despite what appears to be well controlled IOP.

x x x x

We suspect there is a close relationship among IOP, OPP, blood pressure and glaucoma, but the exact nature of these associations remains elusive. Complicating matters is the physiological phenomenon known as autoregulation.[34]

Abstract

Aims: To determine whether systemic hypertension and glaucoma might coexist more often than expected, with possible implications for treatment.

Methods: Case-control study using general practitioner database of patients with glaucoma matched with controls for age and sex.

Results: Hypertension was significantly more common in the 27[,]080 patients with glaucoma (odds ratio 1.29, 95% confidence intervals 1.23 to 1.36, p<0.001) than in controls, x x x[35]

While some of the above conclusions are not definitive, it must be stressed that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation cases."[36] It does not preclude the Court from concluding that respondent's hypertension - apart from her age, work, and working conditions - impaired her vision as a result.

The Court likewise disregards the ECC's finding, which petitioner relies upon, that the primaiy and important risk factors for developing hypertension are smoking, excess body weight, high salt intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical inactivity and psychological factors, including stress. As the Court held in De Castro, these are not the sole causes of hypertension; age, gender, and work stress significantly contribute to its development, and the nature and characteristics of the employment are as important as raw medical findings and a claimant's personal and social history.

Finally, while the ECC possesses the requisite expertise and knowledge in compensation cases, its decision in respondent's case is nonetheless erroneous and contrary to law. The Court cannot uphold its findings; its specialized training, experience and expertise did not serve justice well in this case. The medical certificates and relevant reports issued by respondent's attending physicians ? Drs. Alfred I. Lim, Elmer Montes, and Salvador R. Salceda ? as well as hospital records,[37] deserve credence. The identical findings of these three eye specialists simply cannot be ignored.

In arriving at the above conclusions, the Court is well guided by the principles, declared in Baul and De Castro, that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation cases; that the primordial and paramount consideration is the employee's welfare; that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims for compensation; that medical findings of the attending physician may be received in evidence and used as proof of the facts in dispute; that in any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important as raw medical findings and a claimant's personal and social history; that where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or misconduct; and that the policy is to extend the application of the law on employees' compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed October 30, 2009 Decision and February 23, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

* Per Raffle dated October 13, 2014.

[1] Rollo, pp. 3-19.

[2] Id. at 20-B-27; penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Arturo G. Tayag.

[3] Id. at 31-34; penned by ECC Executive Director Elmor D. Jur?dico.

[4] Id. at 28-30; penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Danton Q. Bueser.

[5] Herein respondent.

[6] Government Service Insurance System, the herein petitioner.

[7] Rollo, pp. 3 1-34; dated June 24. 2004, penned by ECC Executive Director Elmor D. Juridico.

[8] Id. at 20-B to 21.

[9] Herein respondent.

[10] Rollo, pp. 33-34.

[11] CA rollo, pp. 2-9.

[12] Rollo, p. 26.

[13] FURTHER AMENDING CERTAIN ARTICLES OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 442 ENTITLED "LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES."

[14] Citing Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 102 (2001); Government Service Insurance System v. Ibarra, 562 Phil. 924 (2007); Bonilla v. Court of Appeals, 395 Phil. 162 (2000); Government Service Insurance System v. Cordero, 600 Phil. 678 (2009); and Caslor-Garupa v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 521 Phil. 311 (2006). Citing Government Service Insurance System v. Cuanang, G.R. No. 158846, June 3, 2004 430 SCRA 639

[16] Rollo, p. at 7.

[17] Id. at 61-70.

[18] SECTION 1. Grounds. - (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: x x x x

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "'A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.

[19] Citing No. 29 of List of Occupational and Compensable Diseases, Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which states:

29. Essential Hypertension.

Hypertension classified as primary or essential is considered compensable if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability; Provided that, the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report, (b) ECG report (c) blood chemistry report, (d) funduscopy report, and (e) C-T scan.

[20] Citing Hatta Hataie v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 92803, March 22, 1991, 195 SCRA 580.

[21] Rollo, pp. 41 -46.

[22] Those which the CA cited in its assailed Decision.

[23] Citing Philimare, inc/Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Suganob, 579 Phil. 706 (2008) and Government Service Insurance System v. Casco, 582 Phil. 267 (2008).

[24] 529 Phil. 390 (2006).

[25] In layman's terms, "essential hypertension" is defined as:

1) "a common form of hypertension that occurs in the absence of any evident cause, is marked hemodynamically by elevated peripheral vascular resistance, and has multiple risk factors (as family history of hypertension, high dietary sodium intake, obesity, sedentary lifestyle, and emotional stress)? called also idiopathic hypertension, primary hypertension." http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/essential%20hypertension. Last visited November 19, 2014.

2) "persistent and pathological high blood pressure for which no cause can be found." http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/essential+hypertension. Last visited November 19, 2014.

In other words, "essential hypertension" means elevated blood pressure that does not have a known cause.

[26] Government Service Insurance System v. Baul, supra note 24 at 395-401.

[27] 610 Phil. 568 (2009).

[28] Id. at 580-582.

[29] Rollo, p. 33.

[30] CA rollo, p. 12.

[31] Rollo, p. 6.

[32] CA rollo, p. 54.

[33] He, Z, Vingrys, A. J., Armitage, J. A. and Bui, B. V. (2011), The Role Of Blood Pressure In Glaucoma. Clinical and Experimental Optometry, Vol. 94; Issue 2, pages 133-149. doi: 10.1111/j. 1444-0938.2010.00564.x http://onlineHbrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1444-0938.2010.00564.x/full. Last visited: November 19,2014.

[34] Varna, Rohit, MD, MPH, Blood Pressure's Impact on Glaucoma, Article Date: 4/1/2010. http://www.ophthalmologymanagement.com/articleviewer.aspx?articleID=104193. Last visited- November 19, 2014.

[35] M J S Langman, R J Lancashire, K K Cheng, and P M Stewart, Systemic Hypertension And Glaucoma: Mechanisms In Common And Co-Occurrence, accepted 23 December 2004, British Journal of Ophthalmology, http://bjo.bmj.eom/contenl/89/8/960.full. Last visited November 19, 2014.

[36] Government Service Insurance System v. Cuanang, supra note 15 at 648.

[37] CA rollo, pp. 51, 52, 54-60, 62-86, 101, 120, 124.

Lung Cancer Is Occupational Only With Respect To ...

[2014V850] GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE M. CAPACITE, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 199780
2014 Sep 24
2nd Division

Labor > Social Welfare Legislation > GSIS Law RA 8291

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

This is an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court of the decision[1] dated August 4, 2011 and the resolution[2] dated November 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 116030. The appealed decision reversed and set aside the Decision dated June 29, 2010 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), which denied the claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (PD 626)[3] filed by Jose M. Capacite (Jose).

The Antecedent Facts

Elma Capacite (Elma) was an employee in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) - Eastern Samar Provincial Office, Borongan, Eastern Samar, who successively held the following positions between the periods of November 8, 1982 to July 15, 2009: Junior Statistician, Bookkeeper, Bookkeeper II, and finally as Accountant I.[4]

On May 11, 2009, due to persistent cough coupled with abdominal pain, Elma was admitted at the Bethany Hospital. The pathology examination showed that she was suffering from "Adenocarcinoma, moderately differentiated, probably cecal origin with metastases to mesenteric lymph node and seeding of the peritoneal surface."[5]

On July 16, 2009, Elma died due to "Respiratory Failure secondary to Metastatic Cancer to the lungs; Bowel cancer with Hepatic and Intraperitoneal Seeding and Ovarian cancer."[6]

On May 13, 2009, Elma's surviving spouse, Jose, filed a claim for ECC death benefits before the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Catbalogan Branch Office, alleging that Elma's stressful working condition caused the cancer that eventually led to her death.[7]

On August 18, 2009, the GSIS denied Jose's claim. The GSIS opined that Jose had failed to present direct evidence to prove a causal connection between Elma's illness and her work in order for the claimant to be entitled to the ECC death benefits.[8]

Jose appealed the GSIS decision to the ECC. On June 29, 2010, the ECC denied Jose's claim for death benefits.[9] The ECC held that colorectal cancer is not listed as an occupational and compensable disease under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation.[10] Although its item 17 provides that "[c]ancer of the lungs, liver and brain shall be compensable," the rules required "that it had been incurred by employees working as vinyl chloride workers, or plastic workers."[11]

Jose appealed the ECC ruling to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. On August 4, 2011, the CA granted the petition and reversed the ECC findings. Without discussing the nature of Elma's employment, the CA ruled that she had "adenocarcinoma of the lungs" or "lung cancer," which is a respiratory disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation, entitling her heirs to death benefits even if she had not been a "vinyl chloride worker, or plastic worker."

The CA further ruled that Jose was no longer required to provide evidence that would directly connect the deceased's illness with her working conditions; that it was enough that the nature of her employment contributed to the development of the disease. As a bookkeeper, the CA assumed that Elma had been exposed to voluminous dusty records and other harmful substances that aggravated her respiratory disease.

GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its resolution dated November 24, 2011. The GSIS now comes before us for a final review.

The Issues

GSIS raises the following assignment of errors:

I.

THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT METASTASIZED TO THE LUNGS IS AN AILMENT AKIN TO RESPIRATORY DISEASE UNDER ANNEX "A" OF P.D. NO. 626, AS AMENDED, OR THAT SUCH DISEASE IS WORK-RELATED.

II.

THE CA ERRED IN APPLYING THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES SINCE THE LIMITED RESOURCES DERIVED FROM ECC CONTRIBUTIONS SHOULD ONLY BE APPLIED TO LEGITIMATE CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION BENEFITS.

GSIS primarily argues that Elma's illness is not work-related. It is neither listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation, nor was it caused by her working conditions. GSIS asserts that the liberal attitude to grant benefits should not be used to defeat the mandate of the GSIS to provide meaningful protection to all government employees who are actually working under hazardous circumstances.

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

PD 626, as amended, defines compensable sickness as "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions." Of particular significance in this definition is the use of the conjunction "or," which indicates alternative situations.

Based on this definition, we ruled in GSIS v. Vicencio[12] that for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the working conditions.

While item 17, Annex "A" of the Amended Rules of Employee's Compensation considers lung cancer to be a compensable occupational disease, it likewise provides that the employee should be employed as a vinyl chloride worker or a plastic worker. In this case, however, Elma did not work in an environment involving the manufacture of chlorine or plastic, for her lung cancer to be considered an occupational disease.[13] There was, therefore, no basis for the CA to simply categorize her illness as an occupational disease without first establishing the nature of Elma's work. Both the law and the implementing rules clearly state that the given alternative conditions must be satisfied for a disease to be compensable.

No proof exists showing that Elma's lung cancer was induced or aggravated by her working conditions

We also do not find that Elma's cause of death was work-connected. As we earlier pointed out, entitlement to death benefits depends on whether the employee's disease is listed as an occupational disease or, if not so listed, whether the risk of contracting the disease has been increased by the employee's working conditions.

In reversing the ECC and granting the claim for death benefits, the CA relied on the case of GSIS v. Vicencio,[14] which particularly states:

Granting, however, that the only cause of Judge Vicencio's death is lung cancer, we are still one with the CA in its finding that the working conditions of the late Judge Vicencio contributed to the development of his lung cancer.

It is true that under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, lung cancer is occupational only with respect to vinyl chloride workers and plastic workers. However, this will not bar a claim for benefits under the law if the complainant can adduce substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the illness is increased or aggravated by the working conditions to which the employee is exposed to.

It is well-settled that the degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workman's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of a claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment contributed, even if to a small degree, to the development of the disease. [Emphasis ours]

x x x x

We hold that the CA's application of the Vicencio ruling is misplaced. The correct implementing rule under PD 626 or Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation in fact provides that:

Section 1. Grounds.

x x x x

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. [Emphasis ours]

The CA failed to consider that what moved the Court to grant death benefits to the heirs of Judge Vicencio was the proof that the judge had been in contact with voluminous and dusty records. The Court also took judicial notice of the dilapidated conditions of Judge Vicencio's workplace:

The late Judge Vicencio was a frontline officer in the administration of justice, being the most visible living representation of this country's legal and judicial system. It is undisputed that throughout his noble career from Fiscal to Metropolitan Trial Court Judge, and, finally, to RTC Judge, his work dealt with stressful daily work hours, and constant and long-term contact with voluminous and dusty records. We also take judicial notice that Judge Vicencio's workplace at the Manila City Hall had long been a place with sub-standard offices of judges and prosecutors overflowing with records of cases covered up in dust and are poorly ventilated. All these, taken together, necessarily contributed to the development of his lung illness." [Emphasis ours]

In contrast with the present case, Jose merely alleged that throughout Elma's 27-year service at the DAR, she had a very demanding job; that she rose from the ranks as a Junior Statistician, until she reached the position of Accountant I. Jose also explained that Elma had to examine various financial statements for accuracy; perform complex accounting reports; and prepare financial statements. She also had to constantly render overtime work, even during weekends, in order to study, analyze, balance, formulate and finalize reports. All these involved prolonged sitting, exposure to cold room temperature at the office, physical effort and mental exertion, making her highly susceptible to physical and mental fatigue, stress and strain.[15]

The rule is that the party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it.[16] Proof of direct causal connection is not, however, indispensably required. The law merely requires substantial evidence - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion that the claimant's employment contributed, even if to a small degree, to the development of the disease.[17] Thus, there is no requirement that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of a claimant's illness for the latter to be entitled to the benefits provided for.[18] However, it is important to note that adequate proof must be presented to substantiate the claim for death benefits.

In Dator v. Employees' Compensation Commission,[19] we emphasized that the deceased employee had been proven to have been exposed to dusty substances and unsanitary conditions:

Until now the cause of cancer is not known. Despite this fact, however, the Employees' Compensation Commission has listed some kinds of cancer as compensable. There is no reason why cancer of the lungs should not be considered as a compensable disease. The deceased worked as a librarian for about 15 years. During all that period she was exposed to dusty books and other deleterious substances in the library under unsanitary conditions. [Emphasis ours]

In Raro v. Employees' Compensation Commission,[20] we stated that medical science cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer, or a highly paid executive, or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or the resident of a rural area.

By way of exception, certain cancers have reasonably been traced to or considered as strongly induced by specific causes. For example, heavy doses of radiation (as in Chernobyl, USSR), cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. In the absence of such clear and established empirical evidence, the law requires proof of causation or aggravation.

Aside from Jose's general allegations proving the stressful duties of his late wife, no reasonable proof exists to support the claim that her respiratory disease, which is similar to lung cancer, was aggravated by her working conditions. The records do not support the contention that she had been exposed to voluminous and dusty records, nor do they provide any definite picture of her working environment.

We cannot, under this evidentiary situation, grant death compensation benefits solely on the assumption that she might have been exposed to deleterious substances while working as bookkeeper and accountant. We cannot likewise award compensation benefits on the basis of stress and fatigue, which are general consequences of working in practically all kinds of human activity; otherwise, we would unreasonably open the floodgates of compensability and render the purposes of a system like GSIS meaningless.

Insurance trust fund should only be applied to legitimate claims for compensation benefits

While PD 626, as amended, is a social legislation whose primary purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income, it was not enacted to cover all ailments of workingmen. The law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.[21]

The new employee compensation program now directs that all covered employers throughout the country be required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the trust fund would be endangered. In this sense, compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look up to for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur.[22]

As an agency charged by law to manage and administer the limited trust fund of the government officials and employees, the GSIS has the difficult task of insuring all legitimate claims. Suffice it to say that a misplaced compassion for victims of diseases or injuries would prejudice the very same workers and their beneficiaries in times of need.

In sum, for insufficiency of evidence of causation or aggravation, we cannot grant Jose's claim for compensation benefits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 116030 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC decision dated June 29, 2010 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 34-40, penned by then CA Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a Member of this Court), concurred in by then CA Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now also a Member of this Court) and Justice Elihu A. Ybanez.

[2] Id. at 32-33.

[3] Further Amending Certain Articles of Presidential Decree No. 442 Entitled "Labor Code of the Philippines."

[4] Rollo, p. 34.

[5] Id. at 35.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 37.

[11] Approved under ECC Resolution No. 247-A, dated April 13, 1977.

[12] G.R. No. 176832, May 21, 2009, 588 SCRA 138, 146.

[13] Under item 17 of Annex "A," cancer of the lungs, liver and brain" shall be compensable, but only when it had been incurred by employees working as "vinyl chloride workers, or plastic workers."

[14] Supra note 12.

[15] Rollo, pp. 50-51.

[16] Luxuria Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125986, January 28, 1999, 302 SCRA 315, 325; Coronel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996, 263 SCRA 15, 35.

[17] Supra note 12, at 146, citing La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-50918, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 780, 790.

[18] Salalima v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 146360, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 715, 722-723, citing Salmone v. Employees' Compensation Commission and Social Security System, G.R. No. 142392, 26 September 2000, 341 SCRA 150.

[19] 197 Phil. 590, 593 (1982).

[20] G.R. No. L-58445, April 27, 1989.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

Counter-defense of Insanity

[2014V872] AGILE MARITIME RESOURCES INC., ATTY. IMELDA LIM BARCELONA AND PRONAV SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. APOLINARIO N. SIADOR, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 191034

2014 Oct 1

2nd Division

Labor > Social Welfare Legislation > Employee's Compensation

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari[1] challenging the decision[2] dated September 25, 2009 and resolution[3] dated January 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101211.

The Antecedents

On December 18, 2000, Dennis Siador (Dennis), son of respondent Apolinario Siador (Apolinario), entered into a seven-month contract of employment, as Ordinary Seaman[4] on board the vessel LNG ARIES, with petitioner Agile Maritime Resources, Inc. (Agile) - the local manning agent of petitioner Pronav Ship Management, Inc.

On December 12, 2001, Apolinario filed a complaint for death benefits, damages and attorney's fees against the petitioners, including Agile's President, Imelda Lim Barcelona (Barcelona), for the death of Dennis "who fell from the vessel [on June 28, 2001] and who died in the high seas x x x,"[5] while the vessel was cruising towards Sodegaura, Japan. Dennis' body was never recovered.

Apolinario claimed that Dennis' employment was governed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and supplemented by the International Transport Workers Federation-Total Crew Cost (ITF-TCC) Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Under the POEA-SEC,[6] in case of death of a seafarer, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to Fifty Thousand United States dollars (US$50,000,00).[7] The ITF-TCC CBA,[8] on the other hand, grants Sixty Thousand United States dollars (US$60,000.00) to the immediate next of kin of the seafarer who lost his life.[9] As the sole heir of Dennis, Apolinario prayed for the upgraded death benefits under the ITF-TCC CBA.

The petitioners did not deny that the incident happened. Based on the "Master's Statement on S.A.R. Operation for Mr. Dennis Siador"[10] (Master's Statement), they contended that at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of June 28, 2001, Able Seaman Gil Tamayo (AB Tamayo) saw Dennis jump overboard. Tamayo immediately informed Third Officer Milan Crnogorac who sounded the man-overboard alarm - seven short blasts, followed by one long blast.

The Master of the vessel immediately ordered a life ring thrown into the water and put into motion the vessel's man-overboard maneuver by turning the vessel to a reciprocal course on her starboard side. Fitter Rolando Moreno (Moreno) was ordered to keep an eye on Dennis with the use of binoculars. Allegedly, Moreno saw Dennis floating on his back, making no effort to swim towards the life ring. He then saw Dennis sink in the water and disappear from sight despite the effort to rescue him by a team led by the Chief Officer. At 5:15 p.m., with the horizon darkening and the temperature remarkably dropping, the search and rescue effort was called off.

Agile notified Apolinario of Dennis' death through a letter dated July 30, 2001.[11] With the assistance of a counsel and the ITF, Apolinario demanded death and burial benefits, Dennis' accrued salary and leave pay from the petitioners who turned down the claim, particularly for death benefits under the CBA.[12] This refusal led to the filing of the complaint.

The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

In his decision[13] of January 12, 2004, Labor Arbiter (LA) Edgardo M. Madriaga (Madriaga) dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. LA Madriaga found that Dennis - saddled by heavy personal and psychological problems - took his own life by jumping overboard.

On Apolinario's appeal, the National Labor Relations (NLRC) affirmed LA Madriaga's ruling in its resolution dated January 24, 2007.[14] It found no sufficient justification to disturb the appealed decision. Apolinario moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion. The denial prompted Apolinario to elevate the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The CA Proceedings

Apolinario charged that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed LA Madriaga's finding that Dennis took his own life and thus is not entitled to death benefits. He decried the NLRC's "narrow-minded view of the incident;" it failed to consider that "days prior to his death, Dennis was already afflicted with mental disability and could not be blamed for jumping overboard."[15] Apolinario also assailed the NLRC's failure to apply the jurisprudential principle that self-destruction is not presumed.

The CA Decision

The CA partially granted the petition. It reversed the labor tribunal's dismissal of the complaint and awarded Apolinario Sixty Thousand United States dollars (US$60,000.00) as death benefits, but denied his claim for damages. It sustained Apolinario's position that prior to his death, Dennis had been suffering from mental instability, and therefore could not be considered to have intentionally taken his life. It cited the personal accounts of the Filipino crewmembers on Dennis' unusual behavior days before the incident, which narrated that Dennis appeared to be very disturbed, anxious, depressed and restless. These personal accounts are contained in the "Statement on Mr. Dennis Siador"[16] (Crewmembers' Statement) that Master Capt. Dragan Tataj, the Master of the vessel, prepared on the very day the incident happened; the Filipino crewmembers affirmed the statement through their signatures.[17]

The CA opined that without the report of Dennis' previous unusual behavior, it would have been safe to presume that he willfully took his life, but the report on record cannot be disregarded.[18]

The Petition

The petitioners ask the Court to set aside the CA ruling on the ground that the CA gravely erred in reversing the decision and the resolution of the LA and the NLRC, respectively, as they committed no grave abuse of discretion in deciding the case. They insist that there is "ample and convincing evidence" showing that Dennis took his own life and that his death was not caused by his mental problems.

The evidence, they point out, is found in the Crewmembers' Statement, where the crewmembers in contact with Dennis narrated that on the day of the incident "he was just depressed, that he was not ill and that he just wanted to be alone." [19] According to the petitioners, Dennis' statement negates the CA's finding that Dennis was mentally ill.

The Case for Apolinario

In his Comment,[20] Apolinario prays for the dismissal of the petition. The CA's finding that Dennis was suffering from unsound mind days before the incident is fully supported by the records of the case, particularly by the petitioners' own evidence. Apolinario submits, too, that the CA ruling coincides with legal principle in labor compensation cases that self-destruction is not presumed.[21]

The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition.

Preliminary considerations

a. Certiorari under Rule 65 and appeal under Rule 45

In a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling rendered pursuant to Rule 65, the Court determines the legal correctness of the CA decision based on its determination of the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision that the CA reviewed, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, in testing for legal correctness, the Court views the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it.

We draw attention at this point to the basic postulate that in the judicial review of labor tribunals' rulings, their factual findings and the conclusions from these findings are generally accorded respect by the courts because of the tribunals' expertise in their field. There is also the reality that the ruling brought under Rule 65 to the CA is already a final and executory ruling and can only be disturbed if it is void because the NLRC acted without jurisdiction.

This postulate should be related to the intrinsic limitations of a certiorari proceeding: it is a limited remedy aimed solely at the correction of acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; it does not, and cannot, address mere errors of judgment.

Of course, the rule that a certiorari proceeding normally precludes an inquiry into the correctness of the labor tribunal's evaluation of the evidence on which its decision is based, is not absolute; circumstances may exist that would allow the court's review of the tribunals' factual findings and the supporting evidence. One instance is when there is a showing that the NLRC's factual findings and conclusions were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. Another instance is when the tribunal, such as the NLRC in this case, made factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. By established jurisprudence, these kinds of rulings are tainted by grave abuse of discretion.

In the present case, the labor tribunals agree that Dennis committed suicide by jumping from the ship because of his heavy "personal and psychological problems,"[22] as shown by the unusual behavior he exhibited days before the incident. The CA disagreed with the labor tribunals and ruled that even with Dennis' unusual behavior, the "willfulness to take his own life could not be presumed when he jumped overboard" and in fact "cast serious doubt" on the petitioners' claim of willfulness. It added that AB Tamayo's statements that he saw Dennis jump overboard and thereafter make no effort to reach the life ring "are not conclusive proof" of suicide.

As matters stand, the Court needs only to determine whether the CA correctly found that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that substantial evidence exists to support its conclusion that Dennis willfully took his own life.

b. Burden of proof in death benefits cases; burden of evidence

In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the NLRC's finding that Dennis committed suicide, we find it necessary to discuss the burden of proof and the corresponding shift in the burden of evidence in death benefits cases under the POEA-SEC. The relevant provision of the POEA-SEC pertinently reads:

No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.[23]

Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.[24] As a claimant for death benefits, Apolinario has the burden of proving that the seafarer's death (1) is work-related; and (2) happened during the term of the employment contract.[25] Unarguably, Apolinario has discharged this burden of proof.

In the usual course, such proof would have rendered the petitioners automatically liable, except that the same provision of the POEA-SEC allows an exemption from liability for death benefits if the employer can successfully prove that the seafarer's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. That the death of the seafarer was due to his willful act is a matter of defense that the employer has to prove. In legal parlance, the employer carries the burden of proof to establish its claim that it should not be held liable.

Whether it is the employer or the seafarer, the quantum of proof necessary to discharge their respective burdens is substantial evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.[26]

Since Apolinario has initially discharged his burden of proof, the petitioners, in order to avoid liability, must similarly establish their defense. If the petitioners are able to establish their defense by substantial evidence, the burden now rests on Apolinario to overcome the employer's defense. In other words, the burden of evidence now shifts to the seafarer's heirs.

While the rules of evidence are not controlling in the proceedings of the labor tribunals,[27] a structured approach as described above is necessary if the courts were to observe the limitations to their own power of review. Otherwise, as we hinted at in our preliminary consideration, resort to the courts will amount to the review of the intrinsic merits of the NLRC's ruling, in effect a review on appeal that statutory law does not (and, hence, the courts cannot) provide.

We shall proceed to determine whether the CA correctly determined if the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion based on the above considerations.

Substantive considerations

There was substantial evidence to prove that Dennis' death was directly attributable to his own action

In the present case, the LA, NLRC and the CA[28] uniformly found that Dennis jumped from the ship. Additionally, the petitioners cited the following personal circumstances that may have driven Dennis to do what he did: his dysfunctional family; the death of his mother after a lingering illness; the bitter parting with his father whom he had not seen for three (3)[29] after he and his two (2) brothers were thrown out from their home in Talisay, Cebu; and his disappointment with his sister whose medical education he supported, only to learn that she got married and did not even invite him to the wedding.[30]

Based on these facts and the legal presumption of sanity, we conclude that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it affirmed the LA's dismissal of the complaint; we hold that the seafarer's death was due to his willful act, as the employer posited and proved.

Two analogous cases may be cited in support of this conclusion. In Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. v. Leonila Surigao,[31] the seafarer was found dead inside the bathroom of his hospital room with a belt tied around his neck. In denying the claim for death benefits, the Court ruled that substantial evidence suffices for the employer to show that the seafarer committed suicide even if there was no eyewitness to its commission and the possibility of a contrary conclusion existed. In Crewlink, Inc. v. Teringtering,[32] the seafarer, who had already previously jumped in the open sea, jumped again, resulting in his death due to drowning. In holding that it was a case of suicide, the Court ruled that the employer "was able to substantially prove that [the seafarer's] death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea."

With the company's discharge of the burden to prove its defense, the burden of evidence shifted to Apolinario to rebut the petitioners' case. In other words, Apolinario has to prove by substantial evidence that Dennis may be insane at the time he took his life.

By holding that willfulness "could not be presumed" from Dennis' act of jumping overboard, we observe that the CA cluttered its appreciation of the evidence, contrary to the rules on the burden of proof and the burden of evidence that must be observed since the issue before the CA was not the intrinsic correctness of the NLRC's ruling but the existence of grave abuse of discretion.

As the LA and the NLRC found, the petitioners have discharged by substantial evidence the burden of proving willfulness through the cumulative consideration of the following circumstances:

Just a few hours before the incident, Filipino crew members spoke with Dennis in his cabin and asked him if there was anything wrong with his state of health; Dennis replied that everything was in order.

After Dennis jumped from the ship, he was seen calmly floating on his back and was not swimming towards the life ring or the lifeboat while floating on the ocean.

Even the labor federation to which Dennis belonged, agreed that Dennis committed suicide.

Since the burden of evidence was shifted to Apolinario, the reversal of the NLRC's ruling could only be premised on Apolinario's successful proof by substantial evidence of Dennis' insanity or mental illness. The CA, however, instead of proceeding in this manner, imposed the burden of evidence on the petitioners on the ground that "willfulness x x x could not be presumed when [Dennis] jumped overboard."

By doing so, the CA acted as if the petition before it was part of an appellate process rather than an independent civil action of certiorari that is limited to questions of grave abuse of discretion.

Properly, the question for the CA to answer was whether Apolinario established by substantial evidence his claim of insanity.

b. Apolinario did not sufficiently meet the burden of evidence i. inapplicability of Lapid and Naess

In an attempt to establish Dennis' mental illness, Apolinario relied on portions of the Crewmembers' Statement describing through the narration of several crewmembers, Dennis' demeanor and actuations a few days and moments before the incident. It reads:

According to all present, the behavior of Mr. Siador in the last few days was different from his previous one.

- On June 24th[,] Mr. Siador was together with Mr. Canones at the swimming pool and he was telling him some strange things about the future, Jesus, Angels, some visions/predictions that he have. He stated that he will write with his finger something on Mr. [Canones'] back and on the swimming pool bulkhead. His writing will be guided by Jesus. On June 25th, Mr. Siador wrote and draw some unclear messages on two paper napkins and handed them to Mr. Canones. Again he stated his hand is guided by Jesus. These napkins are available for closer look.

- He confided with Mr. Nobleza that there is a gap between him and his father. Yesterday[,] he 'predicted' the future of Mr. Nobleza.

- Today[, at] around 1340 LT[,] Mr. Dela Cruz spotted from the main deck Mr. Siador on the swimming pool deck. Mr. Siador was half naked and holding something in his hands. Mr. Dela Cruz called him but he just [retreated] out of sight. Together with Mr. Tamayo, Mr. Dela Cruz went to swimming pool to locate Mr. Siador but with no avail. He disappeared. After that they went forward to see the Bosun and report this unusual behavior. Bosun decided to go to Engine room and find Mr. Moreno who is [a] good friend of Mr. Siador and try to [find] him and eventually find out the reason for such unusual behaviour.

- Today[, at] around 0500 LT, Mr. Siador called on the phone Mr. Moreno and asked to join him in his cabin. Mr. Moreno went and Mr. Siador said to him "Jesus win, Evil [lose], Bosun [lose].' Mr. Moreno replied OK and returned to his cabin.

- Mr. Alcantara noticed that Mr. Siador in last few days is taking less food than before and that he declined in his personal appearance/hygiene. Furthermore[,] Mr. Siador started to take his food later than the rest of the crew, apparently avoiding other persons. On [Mr. Alcantara's] enquiry about these changes, Mr. Siador said that he [had] one problem but he didn't specify anything.

- Mr. Ave, Mr. Moreno and Mr. Santos, today after lunch [at] around 1245 LT[,] spoke with Mr. Siador in his cabin and asked him if there is anything wrong with his state of health but [Mr. Siador's] reply was everything is in order.

According to Apolinario, the statements describing Dennis' actuations can only point to the conclusion that Dennis was already mentally disturbed a few days before he plunged into the ocean and drowned. Since Dennis was no longer in his right mind, his act of jumping into the open sea cannot be considered willful on his part.

The CA recognized merit in this argument, adding that Dennis' assignment to the Gas Cargo Engineer to perform work outside of his regular duties "obviously took a toll on his mental condition."[33] The CA cited the cases of Lapid v. NLRC[34] and Naess Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC[35] in upholding the presumption of self-preservation over the employer's claim of suicide.

We find the cited cases inapplicable to the present case.

In Naess,[36] the Court affirmed the award of death benefits to a seafarer who "jumped or fell overboard" as he ran towards the deck after fatally stabbing a co-worker. The Court reasoned out that the parties' contract makes Naess "unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits for [the seafarer's] death while in its service." Given this conclusion, the Court only "parenthetically" observed that the "events surrounding the death of [the seafarer] have not been established with any degree of certitude." In short, the employer was liable without qualifications for death benefits because the employer's liability arises solely from the fact of the seafarer's death.

The contract in Lapid is different from Naess. It provides, as in the present case, that if the death of the seafarer is due to his own willful act, then the employer is not liable for death benefits.

The seafarer in this case was found dead while hanging in an abandoned warehouse. While the employer presented a report, stating that the cause of death was asphyxia by hanging, the employer failed to investigate and, consequently, to present evidence on the circumstances surrounding the seafarer's death to indicate that it was a suicide rather than a crime.

The employer tried to bolster its theory of suicide by relying on the seafarer's co-employees' assertion that the deceased had an unidentified family problem. But this claim ran counter to the seafarer's own letters to his family showing his excitement to go home. Under this evidentiary situation, the Court ruled:

On these equivocal avowals, this Court is not prepared to rule that Ariel took his own life. The records are bereft of any substantial evidence showing that [the] respondent employer successfully discharged its burden of proving that Ariel committed suicide, so as to evade its liability for death benefits under POEA's Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seaman.

Unlike these cases, the circumstances surrounding Dennis were duly proven by the employer. That Dennis jumped, instead of fell, from the ship is a uniform finding of the labor tribunals and the CA. The employer also showed by substantial evidence what prompted Dennis to act as he did, without any contrary evidence submitted by Apolinario to dispute the employer's evidence.

ii. Shift in the burden of evidence; proof of insanity

Since the POEA-SEC requires the employer to prove not only that the death is directly attributable to the seafarer himself but also that the seafarer willfully caused his death, evidence of insanity or mental sickness may be presented to negate the requirement of willfulness as a matter of counter-defense. Since the willfulness may be inferred from the physical act itself of the seafarer (his jump into the open sea), the insanity or mental illness required to be proven must be one that deprived him of the full control of his senses; in other words, there must be sufficient proof to negate voluntariness.

In this regard, selected circumstances prior to and surrounding his death might have provided substantial evidence of the existence of such insanity or mental sickness.[37] In Crewlink,[38] we observed:

xxx Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the witness' own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. No such evidence was presented to support the respondent's claim.

But his strange behavior cannot be the basis for a finding of grave abuse of discretion because portions of the Crewmembers' Statement itself rendered the basis for a finding of insanity insufficient. To recall, a few hours before the accident, Filipino crew members approached Dennis to ask him if anything was wrong with him and Dennis simply replied that everything was in order. No proof was ever adduced as well showing that whatever personal problems Dennis had were enough to negate the voluntariness he showed in stepping overboard.

The Court observes that, more often than not, the question of willfulness in causing one's death is explained away as arising from insanity because the very nature of the defense that the employer is allowed to put up is mentally tough to grasp. Differences of opinion can arise and have arisen, as in this case; hence, it becomes imperative for the courts to proceed on the basis of a correct framework of review if stability and consistency in rulings can be approximated.

In the present case, as the petitioners correctly argued, the CA did not expressly find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. What is clear is that the CA simply disagreed with the NLRC's conclusion of willfulness. Unless the CA's basis for its disagreement, however, amounted to grave abuse of discretion, it is in legal error in reversing the final and executory ruling of the NLRC on certiorari.

By erroneously proceeding in its appreciation of the parties' respective burdens of proof and burden of evidence, the CA erroneously, too, required the petitioners to show "conclusive proofs"[39] of willfulness or establish it "with absolute certainty."[40] As a result, the CA itself had to engage in speculation to debunk the required willfulness that the petitioners already established. The CA held:

The Master's Statement that Able Seaman Tamayo saw Siador jump overboard and thereafter made no effort to reach the life ring after it was thrown to him are not conclusive proofs that Siador took his own life.

His alleged jumping overboard from a height equivalent to a five storey building might have caused undue pressure for him to temporary lose his composure which prevented him from seeking the life ring. A life ring may likewise be not that visible at a distance of 25 meters from Siador's position considering the waves at the sea. [Emphasis ours]

While the NLRC may have erred in declaring that there is "no doubt"[41] that Dennis committed suicide by jumping overboard, this error does not amount to grave abuse of discretion since conclusive proof is not necessary to establish willfulness.

Lastly, we must point out that this case is not one of doubt reasonably arising from the evidence. In that case, we would have resolved the case in favor of the seafarer. From the prism of the initial Rule 65 petition that the CA faced, and eventually the Rule 45 petition now before this Court, we find that the petitioners sufficiently established that Dennis willfully caused his death while Apolinario's evidence fell short of substantial evidence to establish its counter-defense of insanity. In other words, Apolinario's complaint must be dismissed not because of doubt but because of the insufficiency of his evidence to support his claim of insanity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 9-37; filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

[2] Id. at 48-57, penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and Sixto C. Marella, Jr.

[3] Id. at 45-46.

[4] Id. at 109.

[5] Id. at 95; Siador's Position Paper, par. 2.

[6] Section 20 (A) 1.

[7] And an additional amount of US$7.000.00 to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not to exceed four (4) children.

[8] Article 26, Annex 4.

[9] And US$15,000.00 to each dependent child under the age of twenty-one (21), subject to a maximum of three (3).

[10] Rollo, p. 130.

[11] Id. at 111.

[12] It appears though that Agile, through Barcelona, had no objection to paying Apolinario's claim for Dennis' earned wages and leave pay, and could have in fact settled the claim as it no longer appeared in the complaint. Rollo, pp.113-114

[13] Rollo, pp. 148-156.

[14] Id. at 185-194.

[15] Id. at 50, ground no. I.

[16] Id. at 131-132.

[17] The following signed the Statement on Mr. Dennis Siador: Chief Officer Mr. D. Jerolimov, Bosun Mr. T. Ave, Fitter Mr. Rolando Moreno, Cook Mr. Edwin Santos, 2nd Cook Mr. A. Nobleza, Steward Mr. J. Canones, Messman Mr. G. Alcantara and Able Seaman Mr. Luis Dela Cruz, id. at 132.

[18] Id.

[19] Supra note 1, at 25, par. 3.

[20] Rollo, pp. 322-329.

[21] Id. at 322, last paragraph.

[22] Id at 155.

[23] Section 20(D), POEA-SEC.

[24] Rule 131, Section 1, Rules of Court.

[25] Sy v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 191740, February 11, 2013, 690 SCRA 202, 211.

[26] Esguerra v. United Philippines Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 199932, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 687, 698.

[27] Article 221, Labor Code of the Philippines.

[28] Rollo, p. 53.

[29] Exact period unknown.

[30] Id. at 122; Respondent's Position Paper, p. 6, par. 1; cited by LA Madriaga's Decision dated January 12, 2004, id. at 152, par. 1.

[31] G.R. No. 183646, 616 Phil. 758 (2009).

[32] G.R. No. 166803, October 11, 2012, 684 SCRA 12, 21.

[33] CA Decision, p. 6, rollo, p. 53.

[34] 366 Phil. 10 (1999).

[35] 237 Phil. 641 (1987).

[36] Id. at 647.

[37] Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 330 Phil. 493, 505 (1996).

[38] Supra note 32, at 21.

[39] Rollo, p. 54

[40] Id. at 55.

[41] Id. at 192.

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